1-1-1984

An exploration of the relationship between counselor moral judgment and counseling behavior : a parametric analysis.

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AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNSELOR MORAL JUDGMENT AND COUNSELING BEHAVIOR: A PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

SEPTEMBER 1984

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNSELOR MORAL JUDGMENT AND COUNSELING BEHAVIOR:

A PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS

(September 1984)

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This study explores the relationships which may exist between the professional behavior demonstrated by counselor trainees in an analogue counseling interview and the style of moral judgment preferred by these counselors. Parent research for this study is found in the work of Allen Ivey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and James Rest. Counseling behavior was described using the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. Moral judgment was identified by the Defining Issues Test. Subjects were forty undergraduate students. Data on counselor professional behavior were generated from ten-minute audio taped interviews conducted by these students. The interviews were coded as provided for in the Microcounseling Taxonomy. This provided clear quantitative information describing subjects' counselor behavior. Moral judgment scores were defined as the relative usage of Kohlbergian levels 5 and 6 or "principled" arguments as allowed by the Defining Issues Test. One moral judgment score, called the P% score, was obtained for each subject. Resultant data were analyzed with the pearson r correlation coefficient and the $\underline{t}$ test. One hypothesis was subjected to the chi

square test.

Parametric analysis of data yielded two significant results. The use of "Helpee"-focused skills and the age of the counselor trainees correlated significantly with the use of principled moral arguments. Nonparametric analysis of one hypothesis using catagorical variables Hi and Lo moral judgment and Attending and Influencing skill usage also demonstrated an association. Other hypothesis testings proved not significant.

Conclusions from the experiment are suggestive, not definitive. Certain methodological flaws may have been responsible for this. Also possible is that no relationship between the variables exists. Replications of the study, which remedy the methodological flaws, need to be completed. Should these prove equally non-conclusive, the profession of counseling is encouraged to consider the theoretical practicality and moral soundness of professional counseling given that no relationship between professional behavior and moral judgment can be found.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Goals of this Study

This study examines the relationships that may exist between demonstrated moral judgment of the counselor trainee and the counseling behavior that that trainee exhibits in an analogue counseling interview. The study will use established psychometric instruments to generate appropriate quantitative and qualitative data. Data so generated will allow correlations between the two variables to be computed. Any meaningful relationships so uncovered can then be discussed for their impact on the fields of both moral judgment and counseling.

Specifically, this study will seek to answer the following general questions:

1. Do counselor trainees who differ in their level of moral judgment conduct themselves differently in an analogue counseling interview?

2. What, if any, reliable relationships exist between demonstrated moral judgment and counseling behavior?

The general premise that arises from these questions is: Counselor trainees with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling interview different from those with lower moral judgment scores.

Technologies presently exist that are capable of describing moral judgment and counseling behavior. Further, extensive research has been

done in each of these areas (Ivey and Authier, 1978; Rest, 1979). This study brings together these technologies and these bodies of research for the purpose of defining and describing the relationships that may exist between counselor trainee moral judgment and counselor trainee behavior. Included in this chapter will be the following two sections: (a) a statement regarding the involvement of values in the practice of counseling and counselor education and the consequent need for this study and (b) an introductory statement regarding the measurement of each of the two variables addressed in this study.

General statement of the issue of Values in Counseling and the need for this study:

Real and vital issues have a nagging habit of resurfacing. The impact of counselors' personal values in their work is such an issue. One example of this issue resurfacing is in an invited response to a Personnel and Guidance Journal article written by Kohlberg and Wasserman (1980). The stimulus article treats a psychoeducational guidance model based on cognitive developmental moral judgment.

In this article Kohlberg and Wasserman encourage counselors and other school personnel to take a much more active role in the moral development of school age children. They suggest using a clear, testable framework based on Kohlberg's approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment. Results reported in this article indicate real opportunities for children's moral growth by following their suggestions.

Ivey, in his response to Kohlberg and Wasserman (Ivey, 1980), is provided with a clear vantage point from which to explore basic concerns

regarding the relationship between a counselor's values and work. Essentially, in this article Ivey examines a basic tenet of the counseling profession by asking the question: "Should we as counselors and counselor educators attempt to remain professionally neutral in the face of frightening moral and social problems around us, or should we structure our profession so as to instill a set of defensible human values which will help to remedy these problems?" This article makes the point that decisive committed action founded on considered moral principles is not only appropriate for counselors but essential for us as professionals and for our changing profession. In his article Ivey approaches the values in the counseling issue from a broad social perspective. He sees the counselor as an integral member of the social framework and therefore partly responsible for the nature of that framework.

In "Maximal Ethics in Counselor Education," Engles (1981) calls for committed professional action to insure that counselor values are consistent with client and social needs. Engles addresses the need for more value-conscious counselors by advocating a direct and significant incorporation of ethics study into counselor education. He cites modeling, active discussion, and didactic education as methods of infusing ethics and values into counselor behavior.

Few would disagree with Engles' assertion that ethics should be an integral and important part of a counselor education program. Yet today, injecting ethics per se into counselor education may not be sufficient to clarify the responsibilities of counselors. Recent applications of theoretical models of influence to applied psychology have

uncovered the tremendous potential for influence inherent in the counseling relationship. Much of this research is brought together in an article titled, "How Counselors Influence Clients", (Senour, 1982). This article reviews studies that document counselor influence as a function of role, exchange, imitation and attribution theories. Senour concludes that counselor influence is very powerful and must be explained in terms that are larger than those describing professionally defined ethical behavior. To Senour, this potential influence in counseling relationships requires that counselors personally explore their own values, morals, and inner selves. She claims that the real issue is not that influence is present and should be externally molded, but that counselors should strive to influence their clients in ways that are authentic, are personally defensible, and result from serious personal introspection.

These three writers see the influence of personal values in counseling from three different points of view. Ivey sees this influence as a social concern of counselors and calls for social action. Engles sees it primarily as a professional issue. His remedy is to circumscribe influence by professional ethics. Senour sees the influence of personal values as a personal issue requiring a personal response. Clearly, differences in emphasis, goals, and probably definitions exist here. Yet, the immediacy expressed by these writers indicates that the issue of counselor values and their impact on counselor behavior is a current and important topic requiring meaningful discussion.

Interest in the interface of values and behavior in applied psychology is not new. The question was prominently raised as far back as the Skinner/Rogers dialogues of 1956 when the ethics of "Imposing general values in therapy" were attacked and defended. Since that time the values issue has come and gone and come again. A truly comprehensive work was published in 1964 by London. This book, The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy, analyzes the theory as well as the techniques of several major schools of psychotherapy as a function of therapist, institutional and social values. Much like the three recent articles mentioned above, London outlines his views dispassionately.

Another scholarly classic treating the values and counseling link is a 1976 work by C. Marshall Lowe. This book, Value Orientations in Counseling and Psychotherapy, systematically documents the philosphical framework from which various major schools of applied psychology spring. The text neither takes a position nor makes a claim for the adequacy of any single methodology; rather, it limits itself to a complete, dispassionate analysis of the value basis of counseling.

Yet, this is not the only way that writers express their views of values and counseling. In addition to a variety of calls for more general awareness of the influence of values in counseling as Ivey, Engles, Senour, London, and Loew have made, an increasing number of writers has moved from the theoretical explication of the values in therapy issue and have begun to advocate clear personal values as an integral part of the counseling process.

Many examples of this advocacy exist. They range from very expansive to very specific values. Some are generally accepted in the coun-

seling profession, and others are controversial. Two that have become so accepted that they require little discussion can serve as examples of the hidden yet powerful effect of counselor values on counselor behavior in counseling situations. These are the values addressing the aims of Liberal Humanism and the values addressing the need for the eradication of sexism and racism.

The first of these is perhaps the most durable; the notion of humanism has been a consideration in the counseling profession since its inception. Today, calls for counselor commitment to humanism are no less visible than formerly, but today they are made with a new sense of urgency. Current and recent exponents call for a renewed avowal of humanistic principles and dedication to action grounded in humanism. These writers claim that a commitment to humanistic principles rather than the previously sanctioned neutrality to all such value stands is absolutely required in today's world. They do this not only because of the claimed inherent morality of humanism, but also because humanism appears to them to be the only basis for actions that can insure the survival of mankind (Carkhuff, 1972; Hosford and Zimmer, 1972).

Racial and sexual attitudes are also singled out as critical opportunities for counselor commitment (Kincaid, 1969; Banks, 1972; Sue, 1977). As with humanism, neutrality to racial and sexual discrimination, many believe, perpetrates these social ills (Pietrofsa and Carlson, 1973). Counselors are exhorted to avoid this neutrality and to employ counseling interventions designed to eradicate racism and sexism in their clients. Again, as with instilling humanistic values, an

urgency pervades their thinking. Yet the message is clear. Counselor advocacy of harmony among the races and between the sexes is an appropriate and necessary activity in counseling.

These and other writers challenge counselors and counselor educators to investigate the essential elements of the values issue in counseling and to erase once and for all the lingering notion of "value freedom" in the practice of counseling. This challenge, in short, is an advocacy of the exact opposite of "value freedom." These writers challenge counselors to be personally committed to authentic values and to express those values in their behavior as counselors.

As sentiments applauding committed, principled action in counseling appear with greater frequency, it becomes clear that counselor education must play a part in maintaining its goal of producing effective counselors who are equipped with the skills and attitudes necessary to reach professional excellence. If advocating authentic values and their consequent action is one of these goals, then counselor education should be prepared to reach it.

The examples above of the call to counselors to values advocacy are only the beginning of a long list of advocacy demands made on the professional counselor. Issues that attract partisan support abound in the world today. Many of these issues trouble clients enough for them to seek the help of counselors. For example, in one's personal life, abortion, sexual preference, euthanasia, and other topics are heavily laden with values. Similarly, in our social lives, overpopulation, pollution and the threat of nuclear war require a clear understanding of the values involved. Often, these issues and their associated values

are integral parts of the therapy interaction.

We know for sure that in professional work the counselor influences the client. Yet we do not know with any surety how that influence is affected by the counselor's basic value positions. Could it be that counselors, when required to address these value-laden issues professionally, are not aware of their own value positions and of the impact that these positions have on their counseling behavior and thereby on the client? Taken one step further, we do not know how that influence is affected by the counselor's basic way of approaching these highly charged values issues. Put into the fundamental context and basic terms of this study, we do not know the impact on counselor behavior of that practitioner's preferred style of moral judgment.

As the "advocacy" discussion above implies, many have skipped this first step. Even the foremost exponent of moral judgment research, Lawrence Kohlberg, has not addressed this question. His two entries into the area of moral development in counseling (Kohlberg, 1975a; Kohlberg & Wasserman, 1980) have advocated moral development as a professional activity of counselors but have failed to address the moral development of the counselor as a person or as a professional.

From this omission it appears prudent for research in that area to begin by backing up one step. Surely, moral values considerations are a legitimate part of counselor activity. Now it is important to begin at the real beginning: the moral judgment of the counselor and the behavioral effects and implications of his capabilities. The research reported in this thesis could be that beginning.

Measuring Moral Development and Counselor Behavior

Moral judgment is a current topic in psychology. The area of investigation, though ignored for many years, now is heavily researched. For the last 15 years that research has been dominated by the cognitive developmental moral judgment approach developed by Kohlberg and others of the so-called "Harvard" and "Minnesota" groups.

Counselor behavior has similarly been extensively studied. Prominent among researchers in this area are those who have analyzed the complex activity of counseling by looking at its component parts. In this study, microcounseling, the current front-runner among these attempts, will be employed as a means of defining and describing counselor-trainee behavior.

The goals of this study of moral judgment and counselor trainee behavior will be achieved through an analysis of data gathered using objective, valid, and reliable measurement instruments. Although complex in their development, these instruments are operationally straightforward. Each instrument possesses the following positive characteristics:

1. Each allows a complete analysis of one of the two variables within the theoretical framework of moral judgment or counselor behavior.

2. Each has quantifiable results allowing for defensible statistical manipulation of data.

3. Each has been widely field-tested and has shown both reliability and validity.

4. Each allows standardized administration and ease of replication.

The performance of the counselor trainers who are the subjects of this study is examined by an analysis of counseling skills usage as measured by Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills developed by Allen Ivey (1971). This taxonomy of counselor skills is the result of research efforts aimed at examining the complex activity known as "effective counseling" (Ivey, 1971, Ivey and Authier, 1978). In these works, "effective counseling" has been analyzed so as to determine the component and essential skills involved. The skills employed in this study are the six (6) "attending skills" and the five (5) "influencing skills."

The attending skills are:

1. Closed questions
2. Open questions
3. Minimal Encourages
4. Paraphrases
5. Reflections of feeling
6. Summaries

The influencing skills are:

1. Self-disclosure
2. Directions
3. Expressions of Content
4. Expressions of feeling
5. Interpretations

Additional dimensions of effectiveness used in this study are:

1. The focus of the above skills (Ivey and Authier, 1978)
2. An independent measure of overall quality developed for this study: The Quality Score.

For additional analysis, sex, age, and counseling experience levels of

the subjects are considered.

Although both microskills and moral judgments each have been extensively researched, there are no known data relating the two classification systems. Research focusing on microskills has covered a wide spectrum, ranging from the original identification of the basic skills of "helpers," (Ivey, Normington, Miller, Morrill & Haase, 1968) to the development of novel applications of the taxonomy and training modality such as social skills training for psychiatric patients (Donk, 1972). Yet the body of research is lacking in the area examining the relationship between microskills usage and cognitive and or personality variables (Ivey, 1971; Ivey & Authier, 1978).

The concept of moral judgment used in this study originates in the work of Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1976) who has defined and refined the three levels and six moral judgment stages found in all subject populations.

These levels and stages are as follows:

Level 1. The preconventional level: The good is what I like and want.

Stage 1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded, bad is punished.

Stage 2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is equated with fair give-and-take.

Level 2. The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's social order.

Stage 3. The interpersonal concordance or "good boy" - "nice girl" orientation: I do what family and society expect of me in order to be good.

Stage 4. Law and order: Good is defined as adherence to the fixed rules and laws of society.

Level 3. The postconventional autonomous or principles level.

Stage 5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good (right) is what is constitutionally and democratically agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the good.

Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. The right is defined by appeal to accepted and self-chosen ethical principles characterized by universality and consistency.

The definition of moral judgment that originates in the above research and the definition used in this study is the following:

> The style of developmental moral judgment that a counselor trainee chooses to employ when making hypothetical moral choices from among issues of justice.

In this study linking moral judgment with counselor trainee behavior, counselor trainee moral judgment is quantified and fixed within the empirically established parameters established by Kohlberg. This is be done using the survey instrument devised by James Rest; (1964), the Defining Issues Test.

Research in moral judgment has been wide. It has included the general developmental theories of both John Dewey and Jean Piaget and specific work of Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1971) and Rest (1974, 1976, 1979). Yet like the microskills work, this body of literature has also been found lacking in a key area: in this case, the relationship of moral judgment to behavior (Rest, 1979). By relating moral judgment level and microskills usage among counselor trainees, this study might begin to remedy gaps in these two bodies of literature.

To accomplish this and to test the general premise as stated above, seven (7) specific research questions have been formulated that utilize the technologies mentioned above. These, expressed as null hypotheses, are the following:

Hypothesis 1. There is no significant difference in the number of different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 2. There is no significant difference in attending skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 3. There is no significant difference in influencing skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 4. There is no significant difference in the use of the focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 5. There is no significant difference in specific microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 6. There is no significant difference in overall quality of counseling between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 7. There are no significant sex differences or age differences or level of counseling experience difference between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The next chapter, Chapter II, reviews the literature treating the theoretical and research aspects of the moral judgment approach and the Microskills Taxonomy employed in this study. That chapter includes: first, a summary of the historical development of the moral judgment

approach used in this study; second, a complete description of that approach as described by Kohlberg; and third, a review of the literature surrounding the Defining Issues Test, an instrument that incorporates Kohlbergian principles and provides this study with a method of investigating counselor trainee moral judgment. Following these sections on moral judgment are descriptions of the theory and research attendant to the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. A final section ties these two bodies of literature together.

Chapter III describes the research questions addressed in this study and the experimental methods and procedures followed to address those questions. Chapter IV outlines results and Chapter V discusses implications and limitations of the present study and considers suggestions for future research in this area of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior. The final chapter provides a summary of the entire study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

This review of the literature in the two areas of cognitive developmental moral judgment and the microcounseling methodology of describing counselor behavior takes two broad views. The first of these looks at the literature describing cognitive developmental moral judgment as a theoretically sound, valid, and researchable concept in theoretical and applied psychology. This view encompasses three parts:

1. An historical summary of developmental modes of moral judgment.
2. A description of Kohlberg's developmental approach to cognitive moral judgment.
3. A description of the Defining Issues Test, the instrument used in this study to quantify counselor trainee moral judgment.

Each of these three parts includes several sections and subsections that amplify the topic addressed.

The second broad view in this review looks at the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This view shows that the instrument is theoretically sound, valid and reliable as a method of describing counselor behavior. This part includes six sections.

1. Introduction
2. A description of methods of skills training for counselors.

3. A description of the microcounseling method of counselor training and the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills.

4. A review of microcounseling and Microskills Taxonomy research.

5. A summary of the four parts above.

6. The Microskills Taxonomy as used in this study.

A concluding statement in this review ties together these two bodies of research so that the goals of this study are addressed.

Part 1

Historical summary of developmental models of moral judgment: from Dewey to Kohlberg

The modern investigation of moral thinking and moral behavior began in the early part of this century with the work of Dewey. Characteristic of research at that time, his work reached conclusions and findings through speculative analysis of observed phenomena in the naturalistic setting. Through an analysis of this type, Dewey postulated a framework describing the development of an individual's moral thinking ability and consequent behavior. This framework consisted of three levels of morality through which each person could pass during his/her lifetime. The three levels are the following (Dewey, 1964):

1. The preconventional . . . . . or egocentric
2. The conventional. . . . . or rules oriented
3. The autonomous. . . . . or principled

In the Dewey scheme of development, an individual moved from one

level to another as a result of experience in the world. Acquiring high level thinking processes and displaying consequent principled behavior occurred as a natural result of experiences appropriate to that thinking and acting.

Other theorists chose other explanations to explain the acquisition of differential moral thinking abilities. For example, learning theorists have explained moral development in the social learning terms of the stimulus response paradigm. Psychoanalytic theorists account for it as a result of ego and superego functions.

These and other explanations have been offered to explain moral thinking variance. Many theories, especially the learning and psychoanalytic, are still current. Yet the most successful current approaches to this area are those which focus, as did Dewey's, on the developmental nature of moral judgment. The most influential of these is Jean Piaget's.

Piaget's work adds to Dewey's speculations by incorporating a more methodologically defensible research model into the search for an explanation of the process of the development of moral thinking. This model included a specific interview procedure for use with children. The procedure consisted of questioning young children in a naturalistic setting (marbles playing) about what rules where required to insure fairness in that setting. These dialogues allowed Piaget to identify sequential levels and stages of moral growth. His work in moral development concentrated on children 4-13 years old (Piaget, 1965). This research has allowed later workers to construct the the following developmental structure:

1. From ages 0-3: The Premoral Stage, in which there is no consciousness of obligation to rules.

2. From ages 4-8: The Heteronomous Stage, where the right was literal obedience to rules, equating obligations to submission to punishment.

3. From ages 8-12: The Autonomous Stage, where the purpose and consequence of following rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange.

(Kohlberg, 1975, p. 177)

The major distinction between Piaget and other investigators of moral thinking was that Piaget demonstrated that perception of morality was a cognitive function. That is, the individual's thinking processes intervene between perception of a psychological event and a judgment about the rightness or wrongness (i.e., morality) of the event. Further, Piaget demonstrated that the thinking process changed qualitatively for an individual as that individual grew older. These changes account for the stages of development.

Piaget is truly the architect of what is now called cognitive developmental moral reasoning theory. The structure and method outlined above have provided a theoretical and methodological basis on which others can and have built additional theoretical and applied models. This has been accomplished in the following ways:

1. By defining the theoretical construct of moral reasoning and acknowledging it as a researchable problem area in psychology.

2. By introducing reliable research methods with which to investigate this problem area.

3. By researching this problem and uncovering highly descriptive information about moral reasoning.

Piaget's theory, method and findings have paved the way for others to follow. Those who have gone on with this work have used the Piagetian theory, methodology and data to introduce an approach to understanding moral reasoning in both children and adults. Further, research in this area has made the transition from purely theoretical investigation to applied areas, opening up practical opportunities and thereby expanding both the knowledge and the questions surrounding developmental moral judgment.

The person most responsible for the growth of this research in America is Kohlberg. His elaboration and modification of this earlier work has been extensive. In particular his contribution has been to add a tremendous bulk of research to Dewey's notion of "levels" and to Piaget's concept of "sequential stages" in moral development. This research has found agreement with the Dewey levels and has refined each of Piaget's three stages to describe a more extensive developmental framework. The complete sequence of Kohlberg's six stages is described below.

KOHLBERG'S SIX STAGE MODEL

Level 1. The Preconventional level: The good is what I like and want.

Stage 1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded, bad is punished.

Stage 2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is equated with fair give-and-take.

Level 2. The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's social order.

Stage 3. The interpersonal concordance or "good boy" "nice girl" orientation: I do what family and society expect of me in order to be good.

Stage 4. Law and Order: Good is defined as adherence to the fixed rules and laws of society.

Level 3. The Postconventional, autonomous or principles level.

Stage 5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good (right) is what is constitutionally and democratically agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the good.

Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. The right is defined by appeal to accepted and self-chosen ethical principles characterized by universality and consistency.

These characteristics are basic to Piagetian theory and the Kohlbergian approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment and will be explained further in Part 2.

Summary of the history of developmental explanations of moral reasoning.

The present approach to developmental moral reasoning has its roots in the work of Dewey and, to a much larger extent, in that of Piaget. Consequently, present research in moral reasoning is dominated by cognitive explanations of how people acquire knowledge about right and wrong. This nearly exclusive emphasis on thinking capacity has surpassed the psychodynamic and operant conditioning models of applied epistemology.

Additionally, Kohlberg's research efforts have yielded the following characteristics of the concept of "stage" in cognitive moral development:

1. The stages are "structural wholes." That is, individuals are consistent in moral judgments and have the option to apply judgments at their highest level in all areas of their lives.

2. Movement along stages is always (except with trauma) forward and adheres to the sequence without skipping any stages.

3. Stages are "hierarchical integrations." That is, one stage includes the others that precede it. Additionally, individuals prefer to function at the highest level that they can understand.

Kohlberg is today the acknowledged leader among cognitive psychologists. His developmental model with its stages of development has been highly

researched, widely promulgated, and considerably controversial. His theoretical perspective on moral judgment, in general, and his approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment, in particular, form the basis for the research on moral judgment and counseling behavior treated in this study.

The following five sections of this review look at Kohlberg's approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment. First, the theory is described. Second, key concepts of that theory are analyzed. Third studies done to demonstrate those concepts that are reviewed. Fourth, criticism of the theory and method underlying the approach is cited. The fifth section summarizes the other four.

Part 2

Kohlberg's approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment.

Section 1: Background of the theory and methodology.

The Kohlbergian notions of moral judgment are thought to be a beginning of the second phase of research in this area. The first phase ended with Piaget's early, pre-1940 work. For a considerable period after that, interest in moral judgment (and other so-called "mental functions") was low. In its place were investigations of more directly observable concrete behaviors. Kohlberg's 1958 dissertation renewed interest in moral reasoning as a cognitive function with study potential. His dissertation began as a replication of Piaget's 1932 work with marble playing behavior of children. In his study, Kohlberg used a different data gathering system and subjects who were older than Piaget's.

Piaget's technique for gathering data involves questioning young children in the naturalistic setting about what rules were required to insure fairness in that setting. Kohlberg modified this approach by presenting his (older) subjects with a hypothetical story or vignette in which a moral dilemma was clearly described. After the subject read the dilemma he/she was asked to say what should be done and why. The questions were designed to lead to an interview and dialogue format of interaction. In this way, each subject could exhibit a pattern of responses that when codified would reveal a favored style of judgment about questions of morality. Two of Kohlberg's dilemmas are as follows:

Heinz and the Drug Dilemma

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about $1,000, which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? Was it wrong or right? Why?

The Captain's Dilemma

In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they would probably not escape alive; there would be about a 4-to-1 chance he would be killed. The captain of the company had to decide who should go back and do the job. The captain himself knew best how to lead the retreat. He asked for volunteers, but no one volunteered. If he went himself, the men world probably not get back safely, for he was the only one who knew how to lead the retreat. Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and courage; but he was a bad troublemaker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up, and shirking his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enough to do the job. Should the captain have sent the troublemaker or the sick man? Why?

(Rest, 1979, p.8)

Kohlberg's findings were an expansion of Piaget's earlier work. As was stated earlier, six stages emerged from the dialogues replacing the three stages revealed through Piaget's interrogative methods. Further, information generated through Kohlberg's dialogic technique concerned, a. how rules are known and shared, and (b) the central concepts of determining moral rights and responsibilities. This information is presented below.

Stages of Moral Judgment

Stage	How Rules are known & shared	Central concept of determining moral rights and responsibilities
Stage 1	The caretaker makes known certain demands on the child's behavior.	The morality of obedience: "Do what you're told."
Stage 2	Although each person is understood to have his own interests, an exchange of favors might be mutually decided.	The morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange: "Let's make a deal."
Stage 3	Through reciprocal role taking, individuals attain a mutual understanding about each other and the on-going pattern of their interactions.	The morality of interpersonal concordance: "Be considerate, nice, and kind, and you'll get along with people."
Stage 4	All members of society know what is expected of them through public institutionalized law.	The morality of law and duty to the social order: "Everyone in society is obligated and protected by the law."
Stage 5	Formal procedures are institutionalized for making laws, which one anticipates rationale people would accept.	The morality of societal concensus: "You are obligated by whatever arrangements are agreed to by due process procedures."
Stage 6	The logical requirements of non-arbitrary cooperation among rational, equal, and impartial people are taken as ideal criteria for social behavior that rational people would accept.	The morality of non-arbitrary social cooperation: "How rationale and impartial people would organize cooperation is moral."

(Adapted from Rest, 1979, pp. 22-23)

As will be pointed out throughout the following sections on the Kohlbergian approach, some of the theory and much of the methodology are in dispute. Information on the approach is presented in detail here because it forms the foundation for another second phase effort. This research, done by Rest and the so-called Minnesota group, counters much of the criticism leveled at Kohlberg in ways that require a thorough understanding of key theoretical concepts. The next section will present these key concepts.

Section 2: Key Concepts in the theory of cognitive moral judgment

Introduction. Because Kohlberg's approach to moral judgment generates from Piaget's early work, it necessarily includes several complex methodological considerations. Many of these are beyond the scope of this study. Yet for the purposes of this study, one central methodological issue should be kept in mind: That moral judgment as defined in the Kohlberg approach applies only to concepts of justice or fairness in interpersonal interactions. Taking this delimitation into account eases confusion that might occur if morality and morals in general were to be considered. An additional issue concerning "what is to be measured" also must be addressed.

The question of what is to be measured. In the Kohlbergian stage concept of moral development, a critical point of departure exists between it and other theories that seek to explain moral development through an analysis of reported or actual behavior. That point of departure is the emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative

descriptions of behavior. For example, Kohlberg contrasts this approach with behavioral and psychometric views on this dimension and finds a fundamental difference. He finds that where the latter views people as an aggregate of quantifiable traits, actions or behavioral bits, the former chooses to measure the qualitatively different patterns and organizational forms employed by the individual under study (Kohlberg, 1969). In short, the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental approach looks at what is being done or reported and is not concerned with tallies or the quantifiable amplitude of that action on those reports.

Essential characteristics of stages of moral development. Earlier in this review, three characteristics of the stages of moral development were listed. These were first reported by Piaget (1965), and later Kohlberg (1958) integrated them into the cognitive developmental moral judgment appraoch. These three characteristics are central to an understanding of the "stage theory" as postulated by Kohlberg and will be explained in detail here. They are important because they are necessary conditions to an acceptance of stage and developmental theory as it is expressed by Kohlberg. This is so because each of these characteristics are conditions that must be met before any exhibited pattern of individual behavior is called developmentally different from another pattern of that individual's behavior. That is, before a person can be said to have achieved any specific stage of moral development, the concepts of morality at that stage must meet the following three tests.

(1) The stage is a "structural whole." That is, individuals are consistent in moral judgments and have the option to apply judgments at

their highest levels in all areas of their life.

This test of the stage concept essentially says that individuals can be stage typed, that is, that an individual will invariably use the same moral arguments in any and all moral choice he/she is required to make. Further, it states that the moral arguments will be the highest level of arguments of which the individual is capable. These arguments become the characteristic moral reasoning style of the individual and allow for stage typing.

Stage typing does not necessarily mean that individuals will always behave as a function of one moral reasoning style. Clearly, situational factors can militate against a congruence between moral reasoning and moral acting. Yet, Kohlberg maintains that the individual will understand moral arguments at that stage and have the option for behavior that results from that set of moral arguments. Whether this option is exercised as an individual's choice is poorly researched in the Kohlberg literature. This topic is treated again in several places. In particular it is mentioned again when critical differences between the Kohlberg formulation of moral judgment and the Rest formulation are explained. The latter of these is the formulation central to the present research.

The structural wholes concept was originally a theoretical conclusion. Experimentation has not consistently borne out this theoretical conclusion (Rest, 1979). In effect, stages have not been verified as defined by Kohlberg. Consequently, the notion of stage typing is called into question, and there is a good deal of controversy over whether stages as discrete steps in a developmental process

actually exist. Recourse to Piaget is of little help. For although his theoretical conclusions clearly indicate levels of development (both logical and moral), his early work voids embracing a stage model of development. Later work by Piaget (1960) accepts the stage concept more firmly. Yet, little evidence has been shown to support it. Nevertheless, Kohlberg has accepted this notion of stage and consequent stage typing. As a result, he has been criticized for building on a weak foundation. This issue is treated in greater detail in later sections that describe the literature on the Kohlberg approach and instrumentation for this study. For the purposes of this discussion of the structural wholes criterion, "stages," although seen by Kohlberg as discrete steps along a linear developmental path (sometimes called "simple stages"), can also be seen as a continuous progression.

Kohlberg's adherence to the former view has earned him methodological and theoretical criticism. Further it should be kept in mind that the structural wholes controversy applies just to the question of whether an individual applies only his/her highest level of development, not to whether or not the acquisition of higher levels of cognitive or moral judgment is developmental per se. The next two key concepts of the theory address this developmental issue and allow for a more indeterminate definition of "stage."

(2) Movement along stages is always (except with trauma or error) forward and adheres to the sequence without skipping any stages.

This criterion of the stage concept refers to the invariant sequencing of stages. Kohlberg claims that only "obvious errors in

observation or ... dramatic regression inducing stress or damage" (Kohlberg, 1976, p .39) can account for any divergence from the invariant forward stage movement. Reasons for this are also found in the theoretical conclusions associated with the Piagetian concepts of concrete and formal operations. In that scheme, once fully developed, the latter supersedes the former in function and automatically becomes the cognitive organization of choice. That is, the person who can think abstractly will choose abstract thought over concrete thought in situations that allow abstract thought. Kohlberg (1969) and Kohlberg (1976) have demonstrated that moral development occurs with the same invariant sequencing. For example, if a person has the cognitive ability to judge moral questions by appealing to democratic principles (Stage 5), he/she will not be able consistently to return to a "me-first" (or Stage 2) mode of moral judgment.

Demonstration of this notion of invariant sequencing in the Kohlbergian approach is accomplished using longitudinal studies. These will be reviewed later.

(3) Stages are "hierarchical integrations." That is, one stage includes the others that precede it. Additionally, individuals function at the highest stage that they can understand.

This key concept in the cognitive developmental moral judgment approach follows directly from the last. It treats both the method of change from one level to another and the individual's preferred level of operation. The general notion of change involves the following. An individual will experience change or moral development movement when a novel experience establishes a disequilibrium within his/her existing

cognitive moral judgment structure. Since a natural tendency toward equilibrium is believed to exist in all individuals (Piaget, 1965), the novel experience must be dealt with in order to achieve that equilibrium. And since some stage is already operational, the individual must employ that stage to bring about new patterns of thought. The old stage or pattern of thinking will be re-worked to reduce the disequilibrium until a new equilibrium is reached. The result will be a new cognitive structure that includes and reintegrates the old structure (Rest, 1979, p. 219).

Preferred usage at the higher level of understanding logically follows these other concepts. The cognitive developmental moral judgment approach claims that the equilibrium reached through restructuring a previously operational stage would be undermined by the use of arguments at any lower stage. This would generate disequilibrium. Consequently, the moral judgment that an individual uses is that which is the most adequate for maintaining cognitive equilibrium, the judgment that reflects the highest level or developmental stage understood by that individual (Kohlberg, 1969).

Summary

The Kohlberg approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment freely adopts the cognitive developmental model put forth by Piaget. Central to that model are the notions of stage, sequence and consequent development. The Kohlberg approach advances Piaget's earlier work because it incorporates a more flexible and more objective data gathering system. Since this more usable system is appropriate for

people of all ages and from all backgrounds, the opportunity to generate large amounts of potentially new data is advanced. This has been the case. Kohlberg's six-stage moral judgment model is generally accepted as the most adequate model to describe the nature of the development of the individual's concept of fairness or justice.

Three key theoretical concepts have been advanced. Acknowledgment of these concepts was demonstrated to be a prerequisite to an acceptance of the moral development approach. These three concepts are the notions of structural wholes, invariant sequencing, and hierarchical integrations. They were introduced and described briefly. Finally equilibrium maintenance was advanced as the stimulus that accounts for the dynamics of moral growth.

The intention in these sections has been to describe the development and present status of the Kohlbergian approach as an enhancement and enrichment of Piaget's empirical and theoretical findings in the area of cognitive and moral development. Kohlberg's approach has been useful to scholars by providing a defensible, researchable framework in which to investigate an ever-widening spectrum of research areas. Those interested in more detailed explanations of the concepts outlined here can find complete, primary source, theoretical, and empirical descriptions in Piaget's 1965 and 1960 works, in Kohlberg's 1958 thesis, and in Rest's 1979 publication.

Section 3: Review of recent literature on the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment

Introduction. The Kohlbergian approach to cognitive developmental

moral judgment began with his 1958 dissertation. Since that time it has enjoyed continued growth and expansion. Many of studies have investigated moral judgment using variants, adaptations, and direct applications of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental model. Many of these studies have addressed the cognitive developmental moral judgment link with some other aspect of psychology or sociology. Some of these aspects are: socialization (Kohlberg, 1969), prisoners (Kohlberg, Hickey, & Scharf, 1972), capital punishment (Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 1975), and most notably, studies of moral education. Much of this and other research have either primarily or secondarily sought to gain descriptive and normative data, while at the same time attempting to validate or demonstrate basic components of the theoretical model.

Another large segment of this body of literature has been critical and, although sporadic, it has generated an acrimonious debate among moral judgment scholars. The degree of passion shown and the defensive attitudes clearly exhibited are unusual in scholarly debate. An example is an exchange in the "Letters to the Editor" column in the Personnel and Guidance Journal. In that journal (December 1981), Hogan, a leading personality theorist, declared that interest in Kohlberg's work indicates that "we may be indeed nearing the end of science and beginning the long slide back into witchcraft and totenism." His remarks were countered in a subsequent issue (March 1982) by one of the most influential supporters of the Kohlberg approach. James Rest began his reply by questioning whether or not critics of Kohlberg have "adequately mastered the theoretical issues involved" (p. 387). He goes

on to make the claim that the cognitive development approach is elegant scholarship. "[I] ... invite anyone to show another research area in all of personality and social development that is in a stronger position than the Kohlbergian morality research in terms of power of findings, replication by different researchers on different samples, triangulation by many lines of evidence/theoretical richness and elaboration and practical implications and applications" (p. 387). He claims that over 2000 studies have been done on Kohlberg's developmental foundation.

The following sections look at some of these 2000 studies. Considered in detail are those included in the two categories mentioned above: (a) those that seek descriptive data while attempting to validate methodology and basic components of the theoretical model and (b) those that address critiques of that methodology and theoretical model.

Validation studies: Introduction. Cognitive developmental moral judgment research can be grouped into several headings that affect one or more basic theory concepts. Studies in these areas have been used to validate those theory concepts. The material below shows the research area paired with the theory concept that it seeks to validate.

Validation of Theory Concepts

Research	Theoretical Concept
1. Longitudinal Studies of moral judgment.	To validate stage and sequence concepts.
2. Cross Cultural Studies of moral judgment.	To validate claim of universality of moral development.

3. Intervention Studies to effect moral development change.	.....	To validate the cognitive conflict (equilibration) concept.

As a research area, cognitive developmental moral judgment considers very basic issues. The subareas of interest above are most often researched in an effort to validate or otherwise describe theoretical constructs. Others exist, but it is well beyond the scope of the present study to report on all of these. The three above are included because they provide the data which have been used as a foundation for the three most important theoretical constructs: the notions of stage, universal invariant sequencing, and developmental movement through conflict resolution.

In the sections that follow, each of these subareas of the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment are examined. The examination of each subarea will describe not only justification for claims made about validation of a theoretical concept but also areas of weakness in those claims to validity for the approach. Following the review of research literature is a section describing criticisms of the approach from methodological and theoretical perspectives. The final section of this part is a statement on the Kohlberg approach that include a description of areas of general agreement in moral judgment research and an introduction to the instrument, used in this study, which exploits those areas of agreement while avoiding many areas of controversy.

Longitudinal studies in moral judgment. Predictable change over

time using the same subjects has been a chief goal in research in the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment. If no change over time can be documented, no stages or levels can be suggested. Further, if found, that change must be shown to reflect some predictable structure common to others. If these two qualifications are not met, the notion of development through sequential stages cannot be accepted. Because longitudinal studies directly address these two analyses, these studies have from the beginning been a continuing part of Kohlberg's research on cognitive developmental moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1958; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1978). These and other studies have satisfied Kohlberg that the six-stage model is valid. He states: "The claim we make is that anyone who interviewed children about moral dilemmas and who followed them longitudinally in time would come to our six stages and no others" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 47).
Others are not so sure.

Over the years the Kohlbergian research has been characterized by at least two distinct phases. These have corresponded with the two assessment techniques that the approach has generated. Reports in Rest (1979) indicate that five completed studies that utilized the early (pre-1978) assessment technique have yielded inconsistent results. Although the general trend in these studies is an increase in moral judgment level over time, reversals and contradictions appear. For example, Kramer (1968) shows that 42% of his subjects demonstrated upward movement over three years. Holstein (1972) also shows this upward movement (63%) with a three-year pre- and post-test interval. Yet

in a similar study with adults, Holstein (1976) was able to show only 29% upward movement during the same three-year interval. This inconsistency is common with longitudinal studies done using the pre-1978 assessment technique. These data are summarized in the following table:

TABLE 1

Upward and Downward Movement in Kohlbergian Longitudinal Studies

Study	Interval between testings	Age of Subjects	No. of cases	Percentage moving up	Percentage moving down	Ratio of Up-to-Down movement
Kramer (1968)	3 years	High School	24	42	17	2.5 to 1
	3 years	College	19	21	16	1.3 to 1
Blatt and Kohlberg (1975)	1 year	12-13 years	10	20	60	1.0 to 3
Holstein (1976)	3 years	High School	52	63	6	10.5 to 1
	3 years	Adults	97	29	18	1.6 to 1
Kuhn (1976)	1/2 year	5-8 years	100	44	24	1.8 to 1
	1 year	5-8 years	50	64	10	6.4 to 1
White, et al. (1978)	1 year	8-17 years	242	47	21	2.2 to 1
	2 years	8-17 years	86	87	8	10.9 to 1
		Average:		50.2	17.7	

(Adapted from Rest, 1979, p. 132)

Inconsistencies in these studies make their results poor evidence for the acceptance of the stage model of moral development. Consequently, taken as a group, these studies are part of the basis for the criticism leveled at the concepts of stage and invariant sequence and at the Kohlberg approach in general. Later studies (i.e., those using the post-1978 assessment techniques) are expected by the Harvard group to be more conclusive.

The most widely publicized of these very few new studies (Colby, 1979) has had very good results. This research has shown upward movement over 20 years in almost all of 58 subjects. Only 16 instances of backward movement occurred, compared with 133 instances of upward movement. Further, no subject skipped a stage.

Backward movement in the revised conceptualization of cognitive developmental moral judgment assessment is considered an expected outcome as long as it is consistent with such movement, as demonstrated in similar longitudinal studies of Piagetian conservation and formal operations. Given this proviso, which nullifies the otherwise detracting effects of backward movement, this new assessment technique holds out the promise that longitudinal studies can yet be consistent sources of evidence for accepting the validity of the stage and sequence concepts.

Cross cultural studies in moral judgment. The investigation of moral judgment development among different cultural groups has received some attention. A few such studies have been done, and like most of the research in moral development, these studies seek to validate one or more of the key theoretical concepts of the approach. In the case of

cross cultural studies, the universality of sequential stages is often addressed. Moveover, demonstration of this cultural universality of stage and sequence offers proof of the validity of the claim that cognitive moral reasoning is a free standing cognitive structure -- free of cultural influence. Demonstration of this claim lends credence to the emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative measurement techniques. In short, cross cultural studies can demonstrate these and other important concepts as they apply to the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment:

> The concept of stage implies an invariant order or sequence of development. Cultural and environmental factors or innate capabilities may make one child or group of children reach a given step of development at a much earlier point of time than another child. All children, however, should still go through the same order of steps regardless of environmental teaching or lack of teaching. (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 357)

A few available cross cultural studies corroborate this statement -- but with qualifications. In Thailand (Blatt, 1969) and in Kenya (Edwards, 1977), adults were studied using Kohlberg's methodology. Results in each study suggest upward movement along an increasingly complex continuum of moral argument. Taken alone, this would indicate that preconventional, conventional, and principled moral arguments might be culturally universal. Yet results of these studies do not show this. Upward movement in these studies does generally correlate with maturation. Yet data suggest the higher levels (i.e., Stages 4, 5, and 6) were achieved only by highly educated and so-called westernized subjects: for example, those who had attended colleges or universities (Edwards, 1977).

Explanations of this range from Piaget's early studies, in which he argues that individuals in a simple, segmented society become fixated at the level of heteronomous obedience (stage 1) to the notion that level 3 moral judgment is necessary, sufficient, and therefore functional in such societies (Edwards, 1977).

This limitation casts the usefulness of cross cultural studies in doubt as demonstrations of the Kohlbergian and Piagetian notions of stage, sequence, and universality. Furthermore, these studies have generated little conclusive evidence that which clearly demonstrates that the content of a culture is not a part of the development of a sequential stage model composed of characteristic stages. Again, part of the problem has been with the assessment tool. The post-1978 technique has yet to be widely tested. Its more refined capabilities are expected to provide more usable information in this and other areas of moral judgment research. Until such time as those data are collected and analyzed, cross cultural studies using the Kohlberg approach continue to be an open subarea of inquiry in cognitive developmental moral judgment.

Intervention studies. Applications of the cognitive development approach to educational settings have taken two directions. These are: (a) theory studies, which attempt to document that moral judgment progresses through stages along an invariant sequence that can be manipulated by interventions that require the resolution of cognitive conflict, and (b) applied studies, which seek to demonstrate a developmentally based intervention strategy where upward movement is the

primary goal.

The first group of intervention studies is of interest here since its primary goal is the demonstration of theoretical concepts. The second group is of limited interest. Summaries of both groups are presented in a table at the end of this section.

Like many areas of moral investigation, moral education suffered a decline in research activity from 1930-1960's. Early work consisted of indoctrination and didactic education and enjoyed little measurable success. Initial cognitive developmental research reacted against this and attempted to remain free from indoctrination and didactic teaching. This was done in part because early cognitive developmental theory required that all analysis and manipulation should be completely uncontaminated by the content of moral judgment. Elegance of design was thought to allow for an analysis of pure cognitive structures. Furthermore, this content-free research lead to an acceptance of the validity and the universality of the three important concepts: stages, sequence, and cognitive conflict as the mechanism of change.

Many research studies have stressed this requirement of content freedom. These studies claim to demonstrate the validity of the three theoretical concepts mentioned above. Two principles are stressed in these studies:

1. Genuine moral conflict (i.e., uncertainty and disagreement about problematic situations) is aroused. No right and wrong answers are provided.

2. Modes of thought "one stage above" the subject's current operating stage are presented.

In one study, Turiel (1974) was able to demonstrate that moral judgment change was always upward under these conditions. Moreover, the movement was investigated under conditions characterized by cognitive conflict. These findings were reached by dividing 6th graders into three groups. One group was exposed to adult role-players verbalizing at "one stage above," another at "two stages above," and a third at "one stage below." Posttesting of the children revealed that those who heard "one stage above" information significantly incorporated that stage into their own verbalizations. Those who heard "one stage below" arguments understood and rejected these. Those who heard "two stages above" arguments did not comprehend that level of moral reasoning. Turiel's findings tend to corroborate the stage and sequence concept and to begin an explanation of the mechanism for change: cognitive conflict resolution. Other studies with these goals have dealt with different populations. Primary school children similarly studied (Selman & Lieberman, 1975) yielded mixed results. Upward movement was described but "teacher effects" could not be separated from the design, indicating some problems with such research with young children. Blatt & Kohlberg's (1975) study produced results more consistent with theoretical expectations. Their design was pilot tested on a small group and later replicated with a variety of school age populations. As with the study by Turiel (1974), developmentally guided classroom discussions of dilemmas were the intervention technique. Appropriate control groups were included. Results "clearly indicate significant upward change in Exp. 1 moral discussion groups, compared with controls .... This upward change is

significant not only in comparison to the control group but to a group exposed to moral dilemmas but without developmentally guided moral discussion" (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975, p.147). Claims of theory integrity are made on the basis that

1. The developmental guidance is "one stage above" reasoning.
2. Movement was always upward and no significant reversals occurred.
3. Change occurred when dilemmas were experimentally paired with discussion designed to produce cognitive conflict (i.e. disequilibrium).

(Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975, p.148)

Turiel (1974) has had results similar to those described above. In his article, findings are carefully tied to the theoretical concepts. In particular, Turiel accounts for presumed regression of individuals along the moral growth continuum by investigating the assimilation component of stage transition. He has done this by analysis of dialogic material produced in the discussion of moral dilemmas. Results support the stage model of invariant sequential development and indicate that cognitive conflict accounts for moral growth. Turiel stated:

> The hypothesis that emerges is that movement from one stage to the next is a process of rejection and construction. Through an awareness of contradictions and inadequacies, the logic of the existing stage is reflected and a new stage is created.
>
> (Turiel, 1974, p. 28)

These and other similar studies have sought to use the intervention procedure as a vehicle with which to demonstrate key theoretical concepts. That effort has produced some clear and some confounded results. As a general rule, those studies that strive to achieve sound design yield measurable and significant results (e.g., Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). These results can then justifiably be applied to

discussions of the validity of theoretical concepts as shown.

Section 4: Methodological and theoretical criticisms of the Kohlbergian approach

Since Kohlberg's early work in 1958, cognitive moral development research has taken several forms. The different forms are designed to produce data that seek to validate one or more of the various aspects of the theoretical framework. Longitudinal studies have addressed the stage and sequence concepts. Cross cultural studies have been done to validate the claim of universality of six-stage moral development. Intervention studies have been done to help define the mechanism that accounts for moral change, and research looking at correlations of behavior and moral judgment has begun the accumulation of a data base to be used in future investigations and applications. Many of these studies have been done, and many make claims to clear-cut and positive results. Yet, as was mentioned above, these studies and consequently the entire approach have not been without detractors. In some very basic ways, the approach has been criticized.

Kurtines and Grief (1974) continue to be the authoritative negative reviewers of the Kohlberg approach. Because their article is acknowledged by proponents and detractors alike as a nearly complete review of the then current articles critical of the Kohlbergian approach, and because it is still nearly universally cited in critiques and defenses of the approach, it will be treated here in some detail.

Kurtines and Grief cite what they consider to be serious methodological and theoretical flaws in the cognitive developmental

approach to moral judgment. They make both general and specific criticisms. First, they criticize Kohlberg's scaled moral judgment, saying that his dissertation is non-standardized and variable, that scoring is overly complex, and that the entire instrument is highly subjective. Furthermore, they say that since the characters in the stimulus dilemmas are all male, sex-role expectations may confound results (pp. 454-456). Additionally, criticisms attack the reliability, stability, and several forms of validity of Kohlberg's technique. Kurtines and Grief cite Ruma and Moser (1967), who also could find no validity for the middle stages. Fodor's (1972) study was also cited as one which has failed to discriminate stages to the degree required by Kohlberg's six-stage scheme. Kurtines and Grief summarize their general criticisms as follows: "First, while Kohlberg's stages are moderately effective in discriminating between unsophisticated and sophisticated reasoning, there seems to be no evidence that each of the six stages by itself has discriminant validity or predictive validity" (p. 460).

Criticisms of Kohlberg's approach attack the invariant sequence concept and the stage model itself. The authors cite results of studies done by Kohlberg supporters, Rest (1973), and Turiel (1966) as not clear-cut and confounded by unaccounted for psychological effects. Analysis of the methodology of these experiments similarly leads Kurtines and Grief to the following conclusion:

> Thus, while the data do suggest that there is some shift in preference and comprehension ... they do not show that the normal course of development ... follows the six stages as defined by Kohlberg.
>
> (Kurtines and Grief, 1974,p. 466)

The invariant sequencing of stages concept is called into question

by Kurtines and Grief by the introduction of the social learning school of moral development. Bandura and McDonald (1963) have argued that social influence is the chief variable that accounts for moral growth. Consequently, since social influence is not ordered in any preset way, moral development similarly would not be ordered.

Another attack on the invariant sequencing notion derives from Holstein's (1972) three-year longitudinal study. Holstein could find no predictable movement upward but found considerable skipping of stages and regression. And finally, in what Rest (1979) has described as a "vituperative" critique, Kurtines and Grief cite the work of Hogan (1970), which strongly suggests personality links rather than cognitive links with preferred moral arguments.

Since 1974 there have been other challenges to the cognitive developmental approach. Some have been theoretical; others have been methodological. Those that criticize the basic theory continue to be impressed by social learning theory, which claims that the stages of the approach reflect only the learned behaviors that typically occur at predictable ages. Those that have attacked the Kohlberg assessment technique have been mollified by Kohlberg's continual modification of his methodology and his continued pursuit of data supportive of basic theoretical concepts. Much of the criticism that has prompted these modifications originated with the Kohlberg group's attempts to redefine its concepts in the light of new data. Furthermore, much of this redefinition has been prompted by the group's agreement with Kurtines and Grief's general criticism that the assessment methodology does not

reflect the theory. Kohlberg's response to these pressures and to the continuing controversy has been a thorough revamping of the assessment instrument. Development of the new assessment tool has been, in Kohlberg's words "very slow, only arriving at a standardized interview and scoring manual with acceptable reliability and validity this year" (In Rest, 1979, p. x). A result of this slow process of refinement of the assessment method has been that the emphasis of criticism shifted from theoretical concerns to issues surrounding the construction of the new instrument. Since that instrument, has only recently been available, little has been said so far. Certainly, critics are getting ready for data from this new instrument, and Kohlberg's new claims for its experimental adequacy will be examined in detail.

These studies will have impact on the theory and methodology of cognitive developmental moral judgment. Yet they are not relevant to the present research. This study employs an instrument which, although a derivative of much of the theory and methodology of the Kohlberg approach, has surpassed most of the criticism leveled at that approach. This instrument is the Defining Issues Test developed by Rest. A description of its development and a review of literature generated by and about it constitute Part 4 of this review.

Summary of criticisms of the Kohlbergian approach. Criticisms of the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment have originated in several places, most notably in social learning, behavioral, and personality theory. These criticisms were brought together in a 1974 appraisal of the Kohlbergian approach. This review criticizes both

methodological and theoretical issues. The authors cite findings and speculations from a variety of theorists, which call into question the stage model, the notion of invariant sequence, the prohibition against stage skipping, and regression and other key concepts in the scheme. The criticism in the review is strong; usefulness of the entire model is questioned. The response from Kohlberg and others supportive of his approach has been extensive. Most of the critical comments centered around the validity of data generated by Kohlberg's 1969 interview method. This factor and others have led the Kohlberg group to reevaluate that data gathering method. Over the last few years that reevaluation has been taking place, and now another instrument is ready for scrutiny by the research community. As this new methodology is used, the controversy will undoubtedly heat up again. Yet the present study will avoid much of this since it uses a derivative of the Kohlberg methodology that has been developed specifically to circumvent most of the criticisms leveled at that methodology. A description of this instrument, its development, and its method of avoiding the theoretical and methodological pitfalls of the Kohlbergian methodologies constitute Part 4.

Section 5: Concluding statement on the supportive and critical literature on the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment

The preceding discussions of research, which seek to validate key concepts of the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment and to accumulate a moral judgment data base, have attempted to show that the area is an important and current research paradigm. No attempt has

been made here to establish the several important dimensions of the approach as fact or, for that matter, as widely accepted theory. The central justification for this extended discussion of moral judgment from the cognitive developmental perspective is that, notwithstanding the many problems associated with the approach, a basic agreement has been established among investigators of moral judgment. The following points are areas of this agreement:

1. Moral judgment is measurable.
2. Patterns of moral judgment are observable in populations.
3. Moral judgment is associated with maturation.
4. Moral judgment change can be effected.
5. Moral judgment correlates with many other personality, behavioral, and demographic variables.

Controversy continues to surround the Kohlberg model over questions of assessment, the rigid stage concept, the invariance of sequence notion, the highest stage usage rule, the link with Piaget's concrete and formal operations, sexism, subjectivism, poor scholarship, and many other issues. Yet throughout this continuing and often harsh controversy, the topic of moral judgment has resurfaced as a legitimate and current concern of theoretical and applied investigation in social and educational psychology.

The next part of this review will be a description of an instrument that has relied heavily on Kohlbergian conceptualizations of moral judgment. The point of departure that makes this instrument and its consequent body of literature different from others is the scrupulous

and conscious effort that its developers and supporters have made to counter the criticisms made of the original research done by the Kohlberg group. In the view of those developers and supporters, these criticisms have been countered; and the instrument, The Defining Issues Test, and the data which it has generated are valid contributions to this second phase of cognitive developmental moral judgment research.

PART 3

The Defining Issues Test

Section 1: Introduction

The Defining Issues Test (more commonly called the DIT) is a direct outgrowth of Kohlberg's and Piaget's work on a cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment. The previous sections describing the work have been preparatory to a description and elaboration of the DIT. This preparation is required because, although theoretical constructs of the DIT differ on some important points from Kohlberg's approach and from Piaget's original theory, the many commonalities shared by the DIT and that approach and theory constitute the foundation of the DIT as a sound psychometric instrument. The explanation of the DIT will highlight those aspects of the instrument leading to its use as an appropriate device to measure the moral judgment of counselors in this study of the relationship between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior.

Part 3 will examine the DIT by addressing the following:

Section 2. A description of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as an instrument designed to measure cognitive developmental moral judgment.

Section 3. An analysis of theoretical and methodological differences and commonalities between Rest and Kohlberg.

Section 4. A review of research that aims to validate the DIT as a measure of cognitive developmental moral judgment including an examination of research findings that correlate or otherwise relate DIT results with other psychological and behavioral variables.

Section 2. Description of the Defining Issues Test

The Defining Issues Test is an objectively scored paper and pencil measure of individual moral judgment. The test is administered in the following way. First the subject reads a short dilemma such as the "Heinz and the Drug" dilemma originally developed by Kohlberg and mentioned earlier in this text. This dilemma describes a situation in which a man's wife is dying of cancer, and the only cure is a particular drug the man cannot afford. The moral question posed is: Should the husband steal the drug in order to save the life of his wife? After reading the dilemma, the subject is presented with 12 statements that express various considerations or questions about the right or moral choice. The subject's task is to decide which of these considerations are very important and which are not. Specifically, the subject rates each question on a scale of "great importance" to "no importance." Then the subject is asked to rank the four most important of these ratings. There are six such dilemmas. A sample dilemma with its opportunities for ratings and rankings can be found on page 56. (The complete

questionnaire is found in Appendix A).

Information about a subject's moral judgment is produced from this procedure because the questions reflect the six stages of the Kohlberg developmental hierarchy. The first statement (in the example) represents an argument characteristic of Stage 4 moral judgment, the law and order orientation. The second question derives from Level 3, interpersonal concordance orientation. The subject reads the 12 questions, rating the importance of each in turn. Presumably each subject will attach the most importance to the questions which he/she understands best as appropriate to the dilemma under consideration. For example, the subject who reads and understands Item 5, "What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act toward each other?" is highly advanced. This item reflects moral judgment that incorporates law, social contact, familial love, and self-interest. It requires that the subject establish a priority for these conflicting claims by considering basic values and principles. Less advanced subjects will read but not comprehend these and consequently will not rate this question as high as other more comprehensible items. Rest's concept of the instrument's measurement goals is summarized as follows:

> In short, the DIT is supposed to work as a developmental measure of moral judgment by the dual process of comprehension and preference: less developed subjects don't pick the high stage items because they don't comprehend them; more developed subjects don't pick the lower stage items because they are viewed as too simplistic. (Adapted from Rest 1979, p.93-94)

The subject rates and ranks six such dilemmas. Information generated include scores reflecting usage at each of the six stages. Unlike the Kohlberg assessment technique, no stage is singled out as dominant or

exceptional. In effect, with the Rest instrument there is no stage typing. Raw scores indicate the number of times a subject chooses stage specific behavior. Percentages of these raw scores reflect relative preference for these stages. Aggregate scores give an indication of preference for principled reasoning. These aggregate scores are the indexes commonly used as descriptors of a subject's moral judgment in correlation and other studies. An explanation of the scoring mechanism is given in the next chapter.

Sample Dilemma From the Defining Issues Test.

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)

_____Should steal it _____Can't decide _____Should not steal it

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
					2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?
					3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?
					4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
					5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.
					6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.
					7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.
					8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other.
					9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow.
					10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.
					11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.
					12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____ Second most important _____

Third most important _____ Fourth most important _____

Section 3: The foundation of the DIT in Kohlberg and Piaget: Key theoretical differences leading to the choice of the Rest theory and instrument in the present study.

As mentioned above, The Defining Issues Test is a cognitive development oriented assessment of moral judgment. As described in the preceding section, it has been constructed to measure recognition and stated preference for moral arguments at the various stages outlined by Piaget and later researched by Kohlberg. It is a simple, practical, objectively scored recognition test of preferred moral arguments.

Since the Rest test completely adopts the Kohlberg hierarchy of stages, and since the moral arguments employed in the test area, in part derived from Kohlberg's assessment technique, one may be tempted to conclude that the Rest instrument is, at best, a summary of Kohlberg's oral dialogic technique into a standardized and objectively scored paper and pencil format. Although this is true on a superficial level, important theoretical changes have been a part of the development of the DIT. These include changes in the basic concepts of stage, stage typing, and content versus structure and indexing (i.e., what is to be measured and how is it to be measured) as a determinant of moral development. These changes serve the dual function of simplifying the approach and answering many of the specific criticisms of the Kohlberg approach outlined earlier.

Over the years, the Kohlberg formulation has received wide criticism over these issues of stage, stage typing, and content/structure. The following brief description of each one will show that modifications made to these concepts in the Rest formulation

greatly diminish the effect of those criticisms when they are leveled at the corresponding concepts that underly the DIT.

Stage and Stage Typing. To Kohlberg, each stage is a discrete step in developmental movement. It is always forward and an individual employs moral arguments characteristic of only one stage in all aspects of his/her life. "The stages form a clustered whole. There is a general factor of moral stage crosscutting all dilemmas, verbal and behavioral" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 186). And furthermore, "Individuals should be consistently at a stage unless they are in transition to the next stage" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 47). Invariant sequence is also a claim in Kohlberg's approach. "Fifteen year longitudinal data on 50 American males in the age period 10-15 to 20-30 demonstrates movement is always forward and always step-by-step" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 186).

More extensive explanations of these concepts have already been made. Simply put, to Kohlberg, one is either in a stage, in transition, or in the next higher stage. There is no other option. The following figure depicts this:

FIGURE 1

THE KOHLBERG STAGE CONCEPT IN MORAL JUDGMENT



Graphic presentation of the Kohlberg stage model.

(Rest, 1979, p. 52)

Rest disagrees with what he calls the simple stage model. His notion of stage is far more fluid. First, he disregards claims of the structured wholes of stages and allows that an individual can manifest many patterns of thinking (i.e., stages) at any given time. His justification for this departure from orthodox Piagetian and Kohlbergian theory is as follows:

> The prevalent reaction of moral judgment research is to acknowledge these discrepancies, (inconsistency of stage usage and invariance of sequence) but to accept them as "decalage," "measurement error," or the sorry state of social science in general. An alternate response is to re-examine our basic developmental model and accept some complications in the model for the sake of a better empirical fit.
>
> (Rest, 1979, p. 63)

Rest suggests the following modifications:

1. Rather than rigidly stage typing an individual, determine to what extent and under what conditions... a person manifest[s] the various types of organizations of thinking."

2. Define developmental as probabilistic rather than fixed. That is, consider that during transitions a person's probability of expressing a particular pattern is an appropriate measure.

3. Reject the step-by-step notion in the face of the pervasive stage mixture displayed by much cognitive developmental research.

(Adapted from Rest, 1979, pp. 63-64)

Once accepted, these three qualifications make for a less rigid and consequently wider concept of stage. A graphic representation of this wider stage concept follows:

FIGURE 2

THE REST STAGE CONCEPT IN MORAL JUDGMENT RESEARCH



Graphic presentation of the Rest stage model

(Rest, 1979, p. 66)

On qualitative versus quantitative assessment and indexing

A second important area of theory based difference between Rest and Kohlberg occurs over the question of quantitative measures versus qualitative measures. As pointed out earlier, Kohlberg adheres to the latter assessment goal. That is, he looks only at what is happening in a moral judgment. Rest maintains that in addition to this qualitative analysis, a quantitative one must simultaneously be made. This is a key difference, which has wide theoretical and methodological ramifications. For the purposes of this study, the central one of these ramifications is the matter of indexing moral judgment.

Any assessment tool must first specify what is to be assessed. Secondly, it must specify how that chosen variable is to be measured. Thirdly, it must specify how the measurements are to be counted so as to arrive at some kind of general measure or score. Rest and Kohlberg essentially agree on the first two specifications. They agree that patterns of thinking are to be measured and that production or recognition of those patterns under controlled conditions is the method of measurement. They differ in the disposition of those measurements. Where Kohlberg is concerned solely with specific patterns of thinking, measurable along the six-stage continuum, Rest is concerned not only with this (the existence of stage specific patterns) but also with the degree of use of these stage specific patterns. In short, Kohlberg's emphasis on qualitative analysis, coupled with the notion that people can operate from only one stage at a time leads to indexing moral judgment by stage typing an individual. That is, a person is in one

stage or another or in transition (see Figure 1). Rest's avoidance of these rules provides for an assessment which allows an individual to be, for instance, in one stage 40% of the time, another 25% of the time,and a third 35% of the time. Kohlberg claims that Rest's data are confounded (Kohlberg, 1976) because they include quantitative measures. Rest claims that Kohlberg's avoidance of quantitative measures implies an avoidance of research data that (a) clearly show that subjects' stage typing varies with test/retest over short periods of time, (b). show a considerable lack of single stage predominance

The preceding discussion makes it clear that the Rest formulation describes cognitive developmental moral judgment in a way consistent with both research data and an intuitive appreciation of this cognitive function. For this and other reasons, the Rest theoretical basis and instrument have been chosen over the Kohlberg theory and method as foundation and data gathering instrument in the present study. The next section serves to bolster this decision by reviewing research that aims to validate the DIT as an instrument measuring cognitive developmental moral judgment. Additionally, the next section includes an examination of research findings that correlate or otherwise relate DIT results with other psychological and behavioral variables.

Section 4: Studies done to validate theoretical constructs of the defining issues test and to accumulate empirical findings

Introduction. Establishing the validity of the DIT has been approached from several different angles. These approaches have attempted to demonstrate different types of validity. Yet the

confidence that validity studies usually claim, in the case of the DIT, is somewhat lacking because the instrument purports to measure a mental construct rather than a directly observable phenomenon. Therefore, no direct validity can be demonstrated. Rather, for moral judgment, validity must be inferred by a wide-angled validity strategy, which relies on many tests to build a case for the acceptance of an instrument as a true measure of moral judgment. The following sections reviews the validity strategy applied to the Defining Issues Test by Rest, its originator. hat strategy includes: (a) criterion group studies, (b) convergence/ divergence studies, (c) longitudinal studies, and (d) experimentally induced change studies. This research taken as a whole accounts for the widely accepted validity of DIT.

DIT validity as a function of criterion group studies

Criterion group validation involves grouping subjects according to some presumed difference. For example, tests of psychopathology are often validated by testing institutionalized persons and persons of unquestioned normality. If the groups reliably divide using the test in question along the same lines as the original groups, the test is considered to be a valid measure of mental health. The first such study seeking to validate the DIT contrasted experts in moral judgment with others of lesser expertise (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 1974). The experts were seminarians and moral philosophy and political science Ph.D.'s. The nonexpert groups consisted of high school and college students. Expected findings indicating an upward graduation of

moral judgment corresponding to training in moral philosophy were found. Results are summarized in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Student Group Averages on Stage Scores

Student Group	Stage 2	3	4	5&6(P)
Junior high n=40	10.7	19.0	32.6	30.3
Senior high n=40	8.7	20.2	27.7	33.8
College n=40	5.0	13.4	22.9	50.4
Seminarians n=25	4.2	13.9	16.0	55.5
Moral Philosophy and political science Ph.D.s n=15	2.0	8.2	17.4	65.2

(Rest, 1979, p. 109)

The study was subjected to many statistical analyses and many sub-groupings. Results indicate that fully 38% of the moral judgment variance among the subject population could be accounted for by age and education.

Little doubt exists that age and education levels show differential DIT scores. Yet, in student samples, age and education levels are each

confounded with the other. In one study with adults aged 24-74, cited by Rest (1979), Dortzbach (1975) found that moral judgment appears to decline with subject age and increase with subject education level. Since the age decreases can be completely accounted for by corresponding decreases in educational opportunities throughout the lives of these subjects, Dortzbach concluded that education level attained is more highly related to moral judgment than is age.

Together, these two sets of studies, those examining active development in the school years and those examining the apparent end-point of development in adults, helped to establish the parameters of the variable measured by the DIT. Results also indicate that the variable measured by the DIT varies with education in general and with moral philosophical education specifically. Further, the growth of that variable appears to stop with the cessation of formal education.

Studies similar to those looking at age and education have linked differential DIT scores to acknowledged liberal and conservative regions of origin. Rest (1976a, 1976b.) found the same predictable results: Lower DIT scores relate positively with conservative locale. Furthermore, Husted (1978) who Rest (1979) cites found that foreign trained (Indian) pediatric residents had lower DIT scores than did American trained pediatric residents. Similarly, Ismail (1976) found that presumably conservative Saudi students at an American university scored significantly lower than correspondingly educated and aged American students. These and other studies further establish the criterion group validity of the DIT as a measure of moral judgment. Data gathered in Rest's validation effort also indicates the range of moral judgment

among these populations and begins to define the relationships between moral judgment as measured by the DIT and such other variables as age, education, training and locale of origin.

Convergent/divergent validity of the DIT. Validity of the DIT as a measure of moral judgment is enhanced when high correlations are found with other measures of theoretically similar variables and when low correlations are found with theoretically dissimilar variables. What the DIT then measures for the former is continuous cognitive development and for the latter, discrete social or individual status. This section will show the DIT be valid as its results converge with (a) tests of moral comprehension, (b) the Kohlberg assessment techniques, (c) validity on the DIT as a function of longitudinal studies, and (d) experimental measures of behavior. Validity will be strengthened by the demonstration of DIT results that are divergent from results of certain tests of attitudes and general intelligence.

Test of moral comprehension. Alston (1971) has criticized Rest and Kohlberg for tapping a preference for a particular moral argument rather than a capacity to produce or recognize those arguments. In an effort to counter these criticisms--and thereby strengthen the validity of the DIT as an instrument that measures an individual's capacity to think in stage specific ways--Rest and his supporters have done studies that link moral judgment with cognitive comprehension. Results indicate that subjects who have lower moral judgment scores tend to be subjects with lower moral comprehension. Similarly, subjects with high moral

comprehension tend to have high DIT scores (Rest, 1979). Rest, et al. (1974) and Rest (1975a) have developed a test of moral comprehension to accomplish these pairings. In this test a short description of a moral argument is presented. Then four statements are presented that purport to be interpretations of the original moral argument. Subjects are asked to rank the interpretations from best to worst. Comprehension of the argument and the correct interpretation is either matched or not matched. The subject's ability to understand the argument is scored. Rest (1979) summarizes data from nine studies using the DIT and the Rest Moral Comprehension Test. Average correlation is r=.51, suggesting evidence that moral judgment and moral comprehension are closely connected.

A further question regarding this connection comes from Mischel and Mischel (1976). They also raise the preference issue and suggest that a study should be done asking respondents to give the "best moral reasoning that they are capable of generating" (p. 88). Rest (1979) reports on research already completed at that time, which had done just that. McGeorge (1975) instructed subjects to take the DIT pretending to be a person with no sense of justice. These subjects could decrease their scores from earlier nonexperimental administrations, but subjects told to take the DIT employing high principles of justice could not increase their scores. McGeorge concluded that moral judgment reflects cognitive capacity rather than simple preference for particular moral arguments. Empirical findings generated from these studies suggest that tests of moral comprehension, specialized cognitive abilities, or

cognitive capacity in general may have predictive value for moral judgment as a variable.

Validation of the DIT as a function of its convergence with experimental measures of behavior. Of particular interest to the present study of counselor trainee moral judgment and behavior is the validity of the instrument, as determined by its ability to produce results that converge with results reached using experimental measures of behavior. Clearly, without some demonstrated connection between reported preference for moral arguments and behavior linked with those arguments, the measure would be very limited in this study.

Rest approaches this complex topic with caution and outlines many problems that attend relating measures of moral reasoning with behavior. These include:

1. The differential ability among individuals to perceive moral precepts in a situation.

2. The problem that some people are less rational than others and operate more from a conditioned response mode than from reflective thought.

3. The fact that some people tend to mimic ideal arguments that play no role in their choice of action.

4. The fact that some people lie about their moral judgment and espouse high principles while behaving according to lower levels of moral development.

5. The fact that people sometimes panic under stress and cannot decide on actions that would have reflected their moral judgment level.

6. Differences in ego strength that can account for differences in action among similar moral reasoners.

7. The effect of interference from other personal values such as pride, greed, ambition, and loyalty. (Rest, 1979, pp. 170-180)

After outlining this formidable array of problems associated with linking moral judgment and action, Rest (1979) concludes: "It is a wonder that any studies have found any significant correlations between moral judgment and behavior." (Rest, 1979, p. 180)

One study (Jacobs, 1977) demonstrated differential promise-keeping behavior as a function of moral judgment level. As theoretically predicted in this study, conventional subjects (i.e., those who had tested out as high in Stages 3 and 4) showed promise keeping behavior more related to the situation than was the promise keeping behavior of those tested as principled. Leming (1978) studied cheating and its relationship to DIT score and reported that DIT scores rise as cheating behavior decreases. The Leming study included high and low supervision conditions and found similar significant results in the high supervision condition but not significant results in the low supervision condition. Sheehan (1979) studied medical doctors' professional performance in residency programs and their DIT score. Spectacular findings indicate that a scrupulously fair supervisor's appraisal of these doctors (N=257) correlate at r=.68, p$.0001 with DIT stage scores. These results alone indicate that counselor performance and DIT scores, such as those in the present study are a highly researchable pairing.

Yet, as indicated earlier, such positive results are rare. Rest (1979) reports on one early behavior study that shows some of the problems involved. McColgan, (1975) studied prisoners. He began with the expectation that criminals would demonstrate low DIT scores. Rest reports low confidence in results, however, because of serious design

flaws. These included the disproportionate number of subjects from disadvantaged backgrounds normally found in prisons and the unknown effects of incarceration itself. Separation of behavior and cognitive variables Rest concludes continues to be problematic.

Rest (1979) cites an effort to achieve better results. McColgan (1977) found a group of predelinquent youths who had not been imprisoned but who still manifested significant antisocial behavior. In this study, DIT score was found to correlate significantly with predelinquency as opposed to age, sex, and sociologically matched controls. A 3-year followup of these experimental subjects was done by Marston (1978). Behavior ratings were obtained from assistant principals and the DIT was readministered. Marston found that original DIT scores still correlated with behavior.

The DIT, then, had been shown to be an instrument that can moderately discriminate among people manifesting behaviors thought to be reflective of moral development. Their behaviors have included promise keeping, cheating, professional activity, and criminal behavior. Given the cautions detailed by Rest mentioned above, these results seem to indicate that more research can confidently be done in this area. One value from these further investigations may be predictions of behavior (e.g., counselor behavior) from DIT scores. Another may be the accumulation of further evidence supporting the claim that the DIT does in fact measure moral judgment.

Divergence studies. In the preceding discussion the DIT was shown to measure a construct similar to that measured by other moral judgment

linked variables. The studies that have done this have demonstrated that the DIT does measure a cognitive construct related to moral judgment. But questions persist: Does the DIT yield unique information? Could other tests yield similar information? More specifically, the question arises, Is it possible that the DIT measures liberal social attitudes, or more basically, general intelligence? The former, liberal social attitudes, is particularly important to proponents because it has been the basis for criticism. Rest (1979) cites one study (Coder, 1975), which addresses liberalism and moral development. In that study no clear relationship could be found between the two variables. The lack of a relationship prompts the conclusion that the DIT does not tap into the same cognitive domain that generates a person's liberal or conservative attitudes.

The link between general intelligence and moral judgment presents another problem. Moral development is presumed to be an aspect of general cognitive development. Rest's claim that the DIT measures something different from IQ is based on several studies. Rest's (1977) study of the electoral preference in the 1976 Presidential election provided evidence for this claim by omitting IQ. Election attitudes were still predictable from DIT scores. In the McColgan study of antisocial behavior cited earlier, results were still significant once IQ was factored out. Therefore, although clearly linked in some basic way with general cognitive ability, the DIT does not appear to measure that construct alone. As the Coder study has demonstrated, the construct measured by the DIT cannot be reduced to a

measure of the liberal/conservative continuum. The DIT, then, measures something that is "distinct from both but serves as a bridge between them" (Rest, 1979, p. 202).

Validity of the DIT as a function of longitudinal studies. Longitudinal studies provide the most direct evidence of moral judgment development postulated by any developmental theory. This direct evidence is difficult to achieve in DIT research for two reasons, One is practical. The other is methodological. The DIT was developed in 1972 and has not been in general use long enough for real longitudinal studies to have been made. The DIT requires that subjects read the material. The requirement limits the lower age of subjects to 13 or 14 years. By that year the subjects have already passed through their most dynamic moral growth periods. Given these limitations, few longitudinal studies of DIT score change have been attempted.

Rest (1979) reports preliminary data from three testings: 1972, 1974, and 1976. Indications are that increase in higher stage usage and decrease in lower stage usage occur over time. Subjects did not change uniformly, however. Subgroup breakdown indicates that group patterns of change are age related; the younger subgroups achieve more moral development than do the older subgroups. The following table shows that change over two years is significant (dark arrow), most often with the 14-16 year old group and least often with the 18-20 year old group. Change occurs for the older subjects but is not significant (light arrows).

TABLE 3

Subgroup Stage Changes Over Two Years

Group	Ages	n	2	3	4	P
Ja + b	14-16	50	↓	↓	↑	↑
Ja	16-18	31	—	—	↓	↑
Sa + b	17-19	38	↓	↓	↓	↑
Sa	19-21	23	—	—	—	—
W	18-20	21	↓	↓	↑	↑

(Rest, 1979, P.129)

These data suggest that a deceleration of moral development occurs as subjects mature. Reasons for this phenomenon have generated considerable speculation. College attendance, generational effects, testing effects, and sampling bias have been considered. Yet no definitive conclusions have been reached. Another study has also failed to shed light on this issue (McGeorge, 1977). In this study nonsignificant gains in moral development were reported. The short (two-year) interval and adult subjects militated against clear-cut results. Clearly, DIT research in longitudinal analysis requires more theoretical and methodological study. At this time, neither clearly valid nor consistent results have been achieved through this type of research. Careful attention to demographic data of subjects and consequent construction of matched groups should remedy this weakness in the body of research. The ease of administration, scoring, and data manipulation

offered by the DIT should encourage these improvements.

Validity of the DIT as a function of studies of experimentally induced change in moral development; findings generated from those studies. Experimental studies with appropriate controls, subjects, and treatment conditions are of real interest for the scientific demonstration of validity. Experimentally induced change, or intervention studies using the DIT, follows one of a few traditional designs: dilemma discussion, modeling of higher stage reasoning, and general educational or psychological (including moral) growth.

The most convincing evidence that change can occur as a result of intervention is provided by the Panowitsch (1975) study, extensively discussed in Rest (1979). In this study appropriate controls, follow-up and research design were optimized, producing significant results. Subjects were college students enrolled in an applied ethics class or in a logic class. Pretesting and posttesting of the DIT and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test were administered. This second test measures an individual's ability to think logically and clearly. Results indicate that the applied ethics students rose significantly in moral judgment but not in logical thinking ability and the logic students rose in logical thinking ability but not in moral judgment. These results are summarized in the following table.

TABLE 4

Averages on Pretest and Posttest of the DIT and CCTT in the Ethics and Logic Class

	DIT			CCTT		
	Pre	Post	$\underline{t}$ test Significance	Pre	Post	$\underline{t}$ test Significance
Ethics class	41.6	46.5	p$.03	43.8	44.7	NS
Logic class	40.1	40.5	NS	44.8	47.5	p$.04

The Panowitch study is to date the best available evidence that moral growth can be effected by experimental intervention. Yet these results are not sufficient for moral education to be clearly understood; important questions remain unanswered. A key question is: What are the natural experiences associated with moral judgment change? Biggs, Schomberg and Brown (1977) seek to answer this question. They found that college students who knew more about literary, artistic, academic/conceptual, and contemporary/cultural items scored significantly higher in principled moral judgment than did other students. In his own research in this area, Rest (1979) found that formal instruction and real life responsibilities were "important" significantly more often by high change subjects. These results were not replicated in a subsequent followup study, however.

In the absence of "hard data" accounting for the natural or experimental events associated with moral judgment change, Rest (1979) has speculated on the following conditions of such change:

1. Discussion with others of moral issues.
2. Exposure to higher level thinking.
3. Recognition of the conflicts and inadequacies of one's patterns of moral thought.
4. The assumption of the responsibility both to take care of others and thereby to assume their perspective or integrate it with one's own.
5. The press of important life decisions.
6. The experience of personal tragedy or of being touched by the tragedy of others.
7. Broadening experiences such as travel, relocation, reading.
8. Meeting new people who have a very different perspective.

(Adapted from Rest, 1979, p.222)

Clearly this list is not exhaustive. Life experiences that can account for moral development change probably occur in other areas of life.

Summary of DIT validity as a function of convergence or divergence with other measures. In this section, studies that seek to validate the DIT as an instrument for measuring moral judgment have been reviewed. Many of these studies have also produced useful data on the nature of moral judgment. Much of this data is also presented. As a whole, these studies provide a validation strategy for the DIT, a strategy that has encompassed several tests for validity. These include: (a) criterion group validity, (b) convergence/divergence validity, (c) longitudinal validity, and (d) validity through experimentally induced change.

In the first of these tests for validity, criterion groups defined by expertness, religion, age, locale, liberal/conservative attitudes, and education were examined. Education in general and education in moral philosophy in particular were the variables most closely correlated with DIT score. Validity was implied since moral judgment is

theoretically and intuitively linked with reason and logic. Both of these are cognitive constructs that education attempts to develop.

The second test for validity in this section looked at convergence and divergence of the DIT with other measures associated with cognitive developmental moral judgment. Tests of moral comprehension, and experimental measures of behavior were reviewed. In these studies moral comprehension was most highly correlated with DIT score. Limitations with research employing behavioral measures were outlined. However problematic, these two areas of inquiry still have provided meaningful results that point the way toward further investigation.

The third test of validity involved longitudinal studies using the DIT. Problems with this line of investigation were defined and studies were cited and reviewed. Results are not conclusive, and the few studies that have been done have serious methodological flaws. The line of inquiry was shown, however, to be one that has a real potential to yield meaningful data, given attention to design considerations and more time.

The fourth test for validity involved attempts to induce change in moral growth as a function of interventions that theoretically induce this change. Studies were cited, and strengths and weaknesses were reviewed. Generally, results are not conclusive, again because of design flaws. One study was cited as illustrative of a properly designed research effort in intervention and moral development. Results from that study indicate that expected change can occur in moral judgment when conditions stimulating that change are optimized.

As a group, these tests for validity suggest that the DIT does

measure a cognitive construct related to moral judgment. In addition, these studies have added a great amount of data about moral judgment and its development. These data not only answer many questions but serve to open and refine many new areas of moral judgment investigation.

Summary of part 3

Part 3 introduced the Defining Issues Test to the present research in order to describe it as a valid and useful instrument with which to investigate moral judgment. This has been accomplished first by a description of the instrument as an objective and reliable measurement tool, which enjoys ease of adminstration, scoring, and data manipulation. Next the theoretical framework of the DIT was compared and contrasted with the Kohlberg assessment technique. Strengths of the instrument were highlighted as a function of this comparison. The last section of this part reviewed many studies that sought to validate the DIT as an instrument that truly measures moral judgment.

This review has demonstrated that a great variety of research has been done using the DIT. In addition, the DIT has been shown to be workable, theoretically sound, and broadly valid.

PART 4

The Microskills Taxonomy of counselor skills

Section 1: Introduction

Counselor behavior has long been a private activity, closed to scrutiny. In the past ten years, however, counselor behavior has been

subject to a variety of analyses. The increased interest in the activity of counseling has occurred as the need for counselor training has grown and widened. The Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is one current response to this need. The present Microskills Taxonomy is the end product of research aimed at producing an operational definition of effective counseling and of developing ways to train effective counselors. These goals are reached in the Microskills Taxonomy by an explanation of the behaviors and skills employed by counselors, which, when used appropriately, can maximize effective counseling.

Section 2: Historical summary of skills training methods

In the past, counselor behavior was expected to develop as a result of the trainee's intellectual and experiential involvment with the theory and the therapeutic model. Until the early 1950's this theory and model were confined to psychoanalysis, the training for which included such orthodox concepts as achieving insight and overcoming transference. The introduction of the client-centered model of psychotherapy changed the structure of that training considerably. Training in the client-centered model included theory as did the earlier approach; however, trainees were also expected to develop an understanding of appropriate and inappropriate counseling behaviors by including recorded interviews that presented effective and noneffective counseling interviews. Students listened, critiqued, and learned from these samples. Yet counselors were still not trained in the specific behaviors that would maximize client improvement. Training was still very broad; although feeling states were singled out and taught,

behaviors were not. Radical as this departure from the psychoanalytic approach to training was, the client-centered method fell short because it failed to identify, train, and evaluate specific behaviors that could be called counselor skills.

This shortcoming was partly remedied by Truax and Carkhuff (1967), who developed an experiential/didactic model of training. Their method attempts to train students in warmth, empathy, and genuineness--three qualities found to be necessary conditions for successful counseling (Rogers, 1951). In their treatment method, students are taught to identify the three qualities mentioned above from audio tapes of counseling sessions. Students then make their own audio tapes and attempt to inject the three qualities into their counseling experiences. Along with this didactic and experiential learning, teachers and supervisors relate to the students in a warm, empathic, and personal context. The procedures have been improved to include refined definitions of the three qualities (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976).

This process of greater specificity in the definition of effective counseling has been carried out by several others. Outstanding are those who have incorporated the complete and more immediate information feedback allowed by video technology (Kagan & Krathwohl, 1967; Kagan, 1975). As innovative as these models of training have been, they still rely on trainee produced stimuli for training and supervision. No models of effective counseling were included in these training programs. Trainees therefore were not provided with sample behavior which when practiced could be incorporated into their own counseling behavior.

This inclusion was accomplished in the training program, which has

been responsible for the development of the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. That training program, Microcounseling, and the development of the taxonomy are discussed next.

Section 3: The Microcounseling method of counselor training: The basis for the Microskills Taxonomy

Early research (Rogers, 1957) has demonstrated that examination of the counseling or therapeutic relationship can result in a better understanding of what constitutes effective work. The Microcounseling training procedure has taken this perspective one step further by the specification of individual counselor behaviors that account for effective counseling. In essence Microcounseling demonstrates that the complex activity of counseling can be seen from a perspective that allows that activity to be broken down into its components without any loss in effectiveness (Ivey, 1971; Ivey and Authier, 1978). Many studies have shown this perspective in a variety of settings. Ivey, Normington, Miller, Morrill & Haas 1968), in an early study, demonstrated that beginning counselors exposed to this separate skills training showed significant change in the usage of the skills. Work that has followed this beginning has expanded the separate skills approach to training by refining basic skills and by defining more complex and sophisticated skills and dimensions of effective counseling. The most recent description of effective counseling as defined by the Microcounseling approach is by Ivey and Gluckstern (1974a, 1974b, 1976a, 1976b) and by Ivey and Authier (1978). In this latest research, the

microcounseling paradigm expresses much of the artistic, intuitive, and coalescing forces of traditional training programs; at the same time it enjoys the clarity, simplicity, and elegance of the separate skills approach.

In this latest version of microcounseling, students are presented with sophistocated video tapes that model highly effective counseling. In these video tapes, skills are shown which include complex behavior and affect. This dual level is possible because the Microcounseling system incorporates two domains: (a) the quantifiable behavior skills, which behaviorally account for effective counseling and (b) the qualitative dimensions of those skills, which account for affective aspects also associated with effective counseling. This dual analysis of behavioral and affective aspects makes the process more nearly complete than previous training models have been. The following material illustrates the two domains that constitute the Microskills Taxonomy.

THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE SKILLS

A. Basic attending and self-expression skills. Underlying all attending and influencing skills are culturally appropriate patterns of eye contact, body language, and verbal following behavior.

B. The microtraining skills.

Attending skills:
CLOSED QUESTIONS. Most often begin with "do," "is," and "are" and can be answered by the helpee with only a few words.
OPEN QUESTIONS. Typically begin with "what," "how," "why," or "could" and allow the helpee more room for self-exploration.
MINIMAL ENCOURAGE. Selective attention to and repetition back to the helpee of exact words or phrases. May also be represented by "Tell me more..." or "Uh-huh."
PARAPHRASE. Gives back to the helpee the essence of past verbal statements. Selective attention to key content of helpee verbalizations.
REFLECTION OF FEELING. Selective attention to key affective or emotional aspects of helpee behavior.
SUMMARIZATION. Similar to paraphrase and reflection of feeling but represents a longer time period and gives back to client several strands of thinking.

Influencing skills.
DIRECTIONS. Telling the helper or helpees what to do.
EXPRESSION OF CONTENT. Giving advice, sharing information, making suggestions, giving opinions.
EXPRESSION OF FEELING. Sharing personal or other people's affective states in the interview.
INFLUENCING SUMMARY. Stating the main themes of the helper's statements over a period of time.
SELF-DISCLOSURE. The helper's "I" statement. What the helper thinks, feels, or has experienced pertinent to the counseling interview.
INTERPRETATION. Renaming or relabeling the helpee's behavior or verbalizations with new words from a new frame of reference.

C. Focus dimensions. The main theme or subject of the helpee or helper's sentence often determines what either individual will speak on next.
HELPEE. The helper's statement focuses on the client. May be demonstrated by the helper using the client's name or the personal pronoun "you." In the case of the helpee, this focus is generally manifested by an "I" statement.
HELPER. The helper makes an "I" statement, or the helpee may focus on the helper through "you" or the helper's name.

THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE SKILLS (continued)

DYAD (GROUP). The predominant theme is an "I-you" focus with both helper and helpee ideas or their own relationship being examined. In group counseling, the words "group" or "we" will appear.

OTHERS. The subject of the sentence is some other individual not present.
TOPIC. The subject of the sentence is a special topic or problem such as job search, tests, and abortion.
CULTURAL-ENVIRONMENTAL-CONTEXT. The subject or main theme of statements focuses on the surrounding culture or environment. "This is a situational problem" or "Women often have this concern."

D. Qualitative dimensions. It is also possible to rate helper (and helpee) statements for the quality of response. Microtraining has attempted to provide single skill units for several underlying facilitative dimensions of helping.
CONCRETENESS. The statement may be vague and inconclusive or concrete and specific.
IMMEDIACY. Statements may be rated for tense--past, present, or future.
RESPECT. Enhancing statements about the self or others are considered to represent respect, while negative statements or "put-downs" indicate an absence of this dimension.
CONFRONTATION. Discrepancies in the self or between self and others are noted.
GENUINENESS. There is an absence of mixed verbal and nonverbal messages. In particularly effective communication, verbal and nonverbal movement synchrony between helper and helpee may be noted.
POSITIVE REGARD. Selective attention to positive aspects of self or others and or demonstrated belief that people can change and manage their own lives.

(Adapted from Ivey & Authier, 1978, pp. 66-67)

Section 4: Research attendant to the Microcounseling approach to counselor education relevant to this study

Research investigating the Microcounseling approach to counselor training has been conducted on many fronts. For the purposes of this study of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior, two research areas will be reviewed: (a) investigation of the behavioral and affective aspects of the counseling process for the purpose of skill identification and skill refinement and (b) studies of personality and demographic correlates with the Microcounseling training model and with individual skills. Those interested in other research areas such as skills transfer and extensions of the training process should consult the second edition of Microcounseling (Ivey and Authier, 1978). Chapter 13 of that text provides comprehensive review of literature to that date. Since many of the studies done in this area are not readily available, that work remains the most comprehensive source of this information.

Research aimed at identifying and refining counselor skills. The identification of the various microskills associated with effective counseling is a process of increasing specificity. The process begins with a conceptual notion suggesting a skill and proceeds through a series of tests and steps. These prove out the skill as one appropriate for inclusion in the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. The conceptual notion derives from either observation or earlier research. The proving out steps further define and refine the skill for the purpose of inclusion into the training format and the Microskills Taxonomy.

Early work introducing the Microcounseling format to counselor training (Ivey, et al, 1968) reported on three skills: attending behavior, reflection of feeling, and summarization of feelings. The process by which these skills were developed has been established as the appropriate process for the development of subsequent skills. First the skill must meet two important tests. First, the skill must be behavioral. That is, it must be objectively identifiable. Second, the skill must be transferable.

Once identified, the process of refining and developing the skill for use in the training program begins. First a counseling interaction video tape is produced in which the skill is deliberately omitted. This interaction is then analyzed; negative behaviors are identified and positive behaviors are suggested. From this analysis, a positive tape is produced that models the skill in question. Both the negative tape demonstrating the effects produced with the absence of the skill and the positive tape showing the impact of the skill are used in the training program. All 11 skills employed in the present study of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior are products of the process of skill development which was originally outlined in the introductory research by Ivey and his associates.

In this introductory research (Ivey, et al, 1968), three skills were presented. The first of these, called attending behavior, was a constellation of three basic sub-skills: eye contact, physical posture, and verbal following. These three behaviors were shown to contribute to client comfort and trust by optimizing the following: (a)

the maintenance of neither too little nor too much eye contact between the client and the counselor, (b) presenting a relaxed yet attentive body posture and, (c) counselor avoidance of "topic jumps" (i.e., changing the subject of the interview).

Also found in this introductory research was a skill, which when used appropriately, would reflect the emotional components of the client's conversation. This skill, called reflection of feeling, provided an opportunity for mutual trust to develop between the counselor and the client and began the development of a sense of understanding between the two.

The third skill introduced by this early research was summarization. This behavior is the skillful selection of information shared by the client and the representation of that information to the client in such a way as to call attention to certain themes, patterns, or the like. In this way, summarization, as defined by Ivey, is a powerful skill designed to direct the attention of the client to specific areas, to help clarify those areas, and perhaps to suggest a new perspective on the concerns discussed.

Extensions of this early work have isolated and developed many additional skills. Two of these are open and closed questions. These skills were first investigated by the Microskills research team, Phillips, Lockhart, and Moreland (1969b). These researchers were primarily interested in the value of open questions. They found that such questions gave the client the opportunity to expand and deepen a response. Closed questions were found to limit the client's response

options and were therefore more likely to reflect the counselor's perspective. Recent speculation (Ivey and Authier, 1978; Ivey, 1980) has explored the positive use of closed questions as a skill designed to achieve affirmation, negation and client commitment.

The skill minimal encourage was isolated from client/counselor interaction by the same research team, Phillips, Lockhart, and Moreland (1969a). This skill was found to serve the dual purpose of encouraging and supporting the client to keep talking while at the same time to offer the counselor the opportunity to reinforce desired client behavior or cognitions.

During this same period, Ivey and his associates (Ivey et al., 1969) were developing a skill called paraphrasing. This skill consists of a restatement of the content of a client statement. Its intent is clarification and direction of the interaction. It also can serve to highlight cognitive rather than affective areas of discussion. This last point is its primary distinction from reflection of feeling, one of the original microcounseling skills.

The general area of influencing skills was opened up by Gluckstern (1972, 1973) with the introduction of the skills, expression of content and expression of feeling. Her work studied client behavior. Sherrard (1973) and later Hearn (1976) developed the skill applied to counselors. These skills provide more influencing power to the counselor. They increase the likelihood that either feelings or content will predominate in the interaction. Consequently these two skills provide the counselor with the option to direct the course of the interview intentionally.

Self-disclosure as a microskill evolved from the basic notions and research of many who have studied essential elements of effective counseling. These include Rogers (1951) who emphasized the value of counselor authenticity and Carkhuff (1972) who presented the well-known prescription for honesty within the helping dyad. Basic theoretical work directly related to this study (London, 1964; Lowe, 1976) suggest that this skill reflects a counselor's basic value position. These researchers claim that these basic value positions affect the counselor's behavior, from the selection of a theoretical and applied model to the actual nature of the counseling interaction. They further claim that, although highly underresearched, various forms of self-disclosure carry great impact when consciously used as intervention tools in applied psychology.

Specific microcounseling applications of self-disclosure have found it to be a useful skill with populations of teachers (Rollins, 1970) and with college students (Sherrard, 1973). As analyzed by the Microcounseling system, self-disclosure supports trust, intimacy, and rapport between the counselor and the client. Examples of this skill are counselor statements that begin with "I" as well as nonverbal actions such as sharing a client's emotional response.

Directions as a skill was introduced in the second edition of Microcounseling (Ivey and Authier, 1978). In this text, directions was parceled out as a skill separate from expressions of content. Directions means telling the client what to do. Sherrard (1973) accomplished the isolation of this skill. He found that the behavior of

telling the client what to do was operative in four distinct group counseling modes. Development of the skill was done by Ivey and Gluckstern (1976b). They found that to be a positive skill, the direction must be given with appropriate eye contact, body language, and verbalization; that it must be clear and concrete; and that it must provide a way in which the counselor can check out that the client understands the direction.

Although little researched, the last of the skills incorporated in this study, Interpretation, is clearly an important influencing skill. Originally isolated for Microcounseling use by Moreland and Ivey (1969), Interpretation continues to be "the most challenging and complex skill within the Microcounseling paradigm" (Ivey & Authier, 1978, p. 113). Interpretation is the skill that allows the counselor to influence the client by the conscious expression of a new frame of reference. Within the Microcounseling training program, this new frame of reference is not bound by any specific psychotherapy or counseling model. The form of the skill is trained while the content is left to the trainee. Through this procedure, skillful intrepretations can be made that originate in any of the several schools of counseling. Little research has been done on this skill. Future studies will help to define it and to develop exercises that enhance its trainability.

Additional basic research armed at skill identification has taken another route: factor analysis. Direct mutual communication, a skill not used in the present study, was isolated through this method (Crowley & Ivey, 1976). Earlier work (Zimmer & Park, 1967; Zimmer & Anderson, 1968) found that rather wide concepts describing qualitative

concepts in counseling, such as genuineness and warmth, could be behaviorally specified and consequently more readily taught. These and other behavior oriented studies have tended to support the basic Microcounseling concept that the complex behavior of effective counseling can be analyzed for its essential components and that those components can then be isolated, developed, and taught. Through this process the desired result, producing more effective counselors, can be achieved.

Section 5: Research aimed at relating Microskills to other variables: Studies of personality and demographic correlates with the microcounseling training model and with individual counseling skills

Studies that seek to relate counselor behavior as described by the Microcounseling approach to other variables are very few. Chiefly they are represented by those studies that relate Microcounseling training success with one or more trainee characteristics. These studies are of interest to the present research because they may provide information collateral to the moral-judgment counselor-behavior link examined here.

Early in the development of the Microcounseling approach the connection between the introversion-extroversion continuum and skills acquisition was studied (Rennie & Toukmanian, 1974). Little conclusive evidence was found that would allow for valid predictions of skill acquisition from this basic personality trait. An additional feature of this study was the inclusion of high and low structure in the training mode. This also failed to discriminate. Neuroticism as a personality

variable was similarly studied (Rennie & Toukmanian, 1976). In this study the skill, empathy, was acquired to a greater degree among the low neurotic subject groups.

A study investigating a personality trait similar to those of the above studies investigated the dependency-independency continuum (Kloba & Zimpfer, 1976). This study used high school students and focused on the microskill called open ended questions and comments. The only significant relationship found was that the more independent trainees used more open ended comments significantly more often than did their more dependent counterparts. Trainer status, also a variable, was shown to be related to increased open ended comments. The design of this research was flawed, however, in that it incorporated no pretest of the usage of the variable.

Ambiguity tolerance, long thought to be an impediment to learning in general and in this case to skill acquisition, was isolated and studied employing the microtraining model (Chassnoff, 1976). Reports indicate that video-based training appears to incorporate factors that may lessen the effects of low tolerance to ambiguity. Also studied in this research was modeling behavior. Similar findings were suggested. Control aspects of the study were not optimized, however, again casting any specific findings into doubt.

Although, as has been indicated, these few studies investigating links between microcounseling skills and personality variables have been methodologically flawed, they do constitute the beginning of this phase of microcounseling research. The research reported in this thesis

extends this area of investigation by attempting to uncover relationships that may exist between counseling behavior as defined by the Microcounseling approach and moral judgment.

Section 6: The Microskills Taxonomy as used in this study

As has been stated before, the essence of the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is the separate skills approach. This approach affords the trainee the opportunity to master one skill at a time before attempting to assimilate the entire range of counselor skills into their practice of applied psychology. An additional benefit of the separate skills approach is that effective couseling can be structured to occur at low levels of mastery in the Taxonomy. Proponents claim that once the basic attending and influencing skills are learned, trainees can provide effective counseling to clients who present concerns appropriate to this level of mastery (Ivey, 1971; Ivey & Authier, 1978). The present research incorporates these two conditions by analyzing the use of only the attending and influencing skills and structuring the interview requirements to include appropriate client material. Having met these conditions, effective counseling occurs in the following way: The first of the two skill groups, attending skills, serves to invite the client to talk or otherwise open up and offer concrete as well as affective information. This not only provides information to the counselor and ventilation for the client but serves to stimulate trust. The second group of skills, influencing skills, consists of those counselor behaviors used to intervene in the life of the client for the purpose of developing new awarenesses,

perspectives, and/or actions. Use of these skills in conjunction with the attending skills can account for enhanced clarity of concerns, expanded perception of options, and most of the other expected goals of counseling. In this study the attending skills are counted both individually and as an aggregate representing attending behavior. This individual and aggregate frequency tabulation is similarly performed for the influencing skills.

Additionally this study looks at the focus dimension of these skills identified using the Microcounseling Taxonomy. Essentially, the focus refers to the stated or implied subject of the sentence that the counselor communicates. In this study that dimension is limited to a count of Helpee-focused skills. These are counselor statements or questions that focus on the client rather than on the counselor, the interaction, the context, or any of the other possible focus options available in the Taxonomy.

The Taxonomy, then, provides this study with a framework from which to analyze basic effective counselor behavior. Since this analysis is limited to a strict count of discrete behavior, it is largely immune to the subjective contaminations often associated with descriptions of human activity. This research expects that simplicity and elegance in design favor clarity in a research area that has historically yielded unclear results.

Summary

The preceding discussion of the Microcounseling Taxonomy of

Counselor Skills has sought to introduce the instrument to the present study. A brief historical overview of counselor training was presented to demonstrate the development of the training program from which the instrument is derived. In this overview the impact on counselor education of several technological advancements was mentioned. This impact has culminated in the present microcounseling program, which utilizes video modeling and prepared samples of effective counseling behavior. Research that has examined this behavior and has isolated the several counseling skills that constitute the resultant taxonomy was reviewed. Also reviewed were studies that, like the present study, seek to relate counselor behavior to one or more personality or demographic variables. The lack of extensive study in this area of counselor behavior research was mentioned. Following this review of relevant microcounseling studies, a description of the use of the Microcounseling Taxonomy in the present study was given. This included a restatement of the basis of the Taxonomy and its potential for use at low levels of counselor expertise. Additionally, the skill groups and the focus dimension employed in this study were specified.

This section has attempted to show that the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is a theoretically sound, valid, and useful instrument to use in this study.

Summary of Chapter II and concluding statements

The preceding review of studies in the area of cognitive developmental moral judgment and counselor behavior has included historical summaries and descriptions of the work of the foremost

theoreticians prominent in the two areas. Covered in depth were the theoretical foundations of cognitive developmental moral judgment, as outlined by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Rest. Also covered were some general problems associated with that theoretical foundation and some specific problems concerning methods of assessing moral development in individuals. Prominent supporters and detractors were cited. Following these sections were descriptions of the Defining Issues Test and explanations of several differences and similarities that exist between that test and Kohlberg's formulations and demonstrations of the validity of the DIT as a measure of cognitive moral judgment. A large number of studies and resultant data were presented to describe correlations of cognitive moral judgment with other cognitive and behavioral variables. These extensive discussions have allowed for the acceptance of the DIT as an instrument that benefits from a recognized historical and scholarly tradition. This discussion has demonstrated that the DIT enjoys a consciously justified validity, which makes it an appropriate instrument in this study of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior.

The present chapter also sought to describe the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This instrument was similarly shown to be the end result of defensible research efforts whose source is drawn from a rich historical tradition. Mentioned in that tradition were Rogers, Kagan, Carkhuff and Ivey. The Microcounseling training program was outlined, and the development and usefulness of the taxonomy derived from that training program were described. As with the Defining Issues

Test, the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills was shown to be a valid, reliable and practical instrument for its intended use to describe and define counselor behavior.

The extensive discussions that constitute this chapter and are summarized above are required in this report because of the tenuous nature of the variables investigated in this study. In short, both moral judgment and counselor behavior are difficult to quantify. The instruments described in this review succeed in this effort within their respective domains. This individual success suggests their joint use in this study of moral judgment and counselor behavior.

Conclusive results in moral judgment research and in counseling research are truly rare. This study, like most others which look at these variables, seeks to uncover those rare conclusive results. Yet another dimension exists here. In addition to the academic interest inherent in any correlational study, there exists here another interest. In addition to "what is," this study seeks to consider "what should be." In the first case, should conclusive results emanate from this research, they will be examined and discussed. Should the opposite occur, one must wonder why this has occurred given the sensitivity of the measurement instruments. Certainly, design flaws and methodological errors can occur. Yet, if these are kept to a minimum, is it not true that negative results may also have pervasive implications? Specifically, one may ask, "If we consistantly can find no clear relationship between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior, what does this mean for the professions of counseling and counselor education?" Furthermore, if counselor moral judgment cannot be revealed through an analysis of

counselor behavior or vice versa, then does moral judgment play no part in counseling? Is this a desirable aspect of the counseling professions? These and other questions are considered in Chapter V, where a discussion of results of the present research will be presented.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Introduction

In this chapter, the procedures and methods used to uncover possible relationships between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior will be reviewed. Included here will be an overview of the study, general premise and hypotheses, selection of subjects, instrumentation, data collection and coding, and a description of the analysis of the data.

Overview of the study

This study was designed to investigate the relationships that may exist between the moral judgment of counselor trainees and the behavior that those trainees exhibit in an analogue counseling interview. The study is outlined below.

1. Forty volunteer subects were chosen from a class of 82 counselor trainees.

2. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was presented to these subjects as a noncredit take-home project.

3. The DIT questionnaires were collected within three weeks and then machine scored.

4. As a part of the regular classwork, each student prepared an audio tape and transcription of a five minute actual or role-played counseling session with the counselor trainee acting as counselor.

Copies of these transcriptions for the 40 DIT participants were collected.

5. The transcript data were coded using the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills, thereby obtaining descriptive information about individual counselor trainee behavior.

6. Statistical analysis of the microskill data describing counselor behavor and the DIT data describing moral judgment were completed.

General premise and hypotheses

The operational problems outlined in Chapter 2, Section 1 describing a fundamental lack of knowledge about counselor moral judgment and its effect on counseling behavior indicate a need for an orderly investigation of these variables and their potential interface. The previous descriptions of moral judgment as currently understood within the developmental context and a method of analyzing counselor activity using the Mickroskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills point to a framework of investigation. With this framework one general premise arises: Counselor trainers with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation different from those with lower moral judgment scores. The general premise will be tested in this study by an analysis of counselor trainee moral judgment and accompanying counselor behavior. The following null hypotheses have been generated to accomplish this:

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the number of different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The skills involved in this and the other tests of the general premise will be the six basic attending skills and the five basic influencing skills. The former are closed questions, open questions, minimal encourages, paraphrase, reflections of feeling, and summaries. The latter are directions, expressions of content, expressions of feeling, self-disclosure and interpretations. The score which will be related to moral judgment will be the number of different skills used by the counselor. The range will therefore be 0-11. This score will reflect general usage or variety of response mode.

Hypotheses 2: There is no significant difference in attending skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The skills used in this test of the general premise will be six attending skills taken as an aggregate measure. The range will, therefore, depend on counselor usage. This score reflects the counselor's tendency to use the more basic skill group in the time limited counseling interview.

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in influencing skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The skills used in this test of the general premise will be the five influencing skills as an aggregate measure. Similar to the above test, the range will depend on counselor usage. Thus this score reflects the counselor's tendency to use the more advanced skill group in the counseling situation.

Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

As was pointed out earlier, the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor skills provides for qualitative dimensions as well as for quantifiable skills of the counseling process. Among the former are "Focus" options. These relate to the topic of the interview at any given moment. The following options are provided for: Helpee, Helper, dyad, others, topic, and cultural environmental context. The score that will be related to moral judgment in the study will be the total number of "helpee" focused responses. That is, the total number of times that the counselor responded in such a way as to bring to or maintain the focus of the interaction on the client. Such responses are considered to facilitate the client's self-focus, are desirable, and are therefore indicative of effective counseling.

Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in specific microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

This test will examine the possibility that one or more specific skills of the 11 skills employed in this study may be related to moral judgment as measured by the DIT.

Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in overall quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

A procedure, explained later under "instrumentation", will be developed that will allow an overall quality score to be computed. This score will be independent of the Ivey Taxonomy. The quality score will be related to DIT score to seek a relationship between counselor activity and moral judgment.

Hypothesis 7: There are no sex differences or age differences or level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Moral judgment as measured by the DIT has been shown to correlate significantly with age and not significantly with sex. This test will investigate links between sex and age and moral judgment. As an added check, level of counseling experience will be related to moral judgment.

Subjects

Subjects for this study were students enrolled in an introductory course in counseling at the University of Massachusetts. The students were nearly all degree seeking undergraduates. The course is open only to those who express a desire to pursue a career in a helping profession. Therefore, students who enroll are considered for the purposes of this study to be counselor trainees at the most basic and naive level.

Forty male and female students volunteered to participate in the study. The entire class numbered 82. Age range was from 19 to 40. Academic experience in counseling was constant at a low level. Work experience in the field varied from none to several years. The following table illustrates the sex, age and experience levels of participants.

TABLE 5

Table of Sex, Age, and Experience

SEX	FREQUENCY	CUM FREQ	PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
F	34	34	85.0	85.0
M	6	40	15.0	100.0

AGE	FREQUENCY	CUM FREQ	PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
19	2	2	5.0	5.0
20	11	13	27.5	32.5
21	9	22	22.5	55.0
22	3	25	7.5	62.5
23	6	31	15.0	77.5
24	1	32	2.5	80.0
28	1	23	2.5	82.5
29	1	34	2.5	85.0
30	2	36	2.5	90.0
32	1	38	2.5	92.5
33	1	38	2.5	95.0
35	1	39	2.5	97.5
40	1	40	2.5	100.0

EXPERIENCE	FREQUENCY	CUM FREQ	PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1. No Exp.	9	9	22.5	22.5
2. Some to 2 yrs Exp.	20	29	50.0	72.6
3. More than 2 yrs Exp.	11	40	27.5	100.0

Instrumentation and data collection

Three measurement instruments were used in this study to gather data on counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior: 1. The Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1972, 1976), 2. The Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills (Ivey et al, 1968, 1978), and 3. The Quality Score, a measure of overall quality of counseling developed for this study. Each is described below.

1. The Defining Issues Test

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an instrument that quantifies moral judgment and has been discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this report. That discussion described the instrument, its administration, the similarities and dissimilarities between it and the Kohlberg measures, and the development of an argument for the acceptance of its validity.

The DIT is a paper and pencil test designed to reveal and quantify the various ways a respondent understands the concept of fairness. Six options for that understanding are provided for in the instrument: a. egocentricism, b. obedience and avoidance of punishment, c. instrumental hedonism and concrete reciprocity, d. fixed rules and maintenance of the social order, e. social contract and utilitarian law-making perspective, and f. universal ethical principles orientation. The test is administered as a survey of personal opinion with a suggested 45 minute time limit. It is objectively scored. The DIT's similarity with Kohlberg's instruments is chiefly concerned with the developmental basis for moral judgment. Important divergences occur both in that

developmental concept and in other important theoretical foundations. These have been treated earlier in Chapter 2. For reasons explained in that chapter, the Rest instrument was chosen over the Kohlberg instrument for use in this study. Validity of the DIT has been well researched. Studies mentioned earlier accent several approaches to the demonstration of the instrument's validity. Among these are criterion group validity, convergence/divergence validity, longitudinal validity and validity demonstrated through experimentally induced change.

There are two forms of the DIT, a three-story form and six-story form. In the present study, the six story form was used. Both forms have been shown to provide investigators with high test-retest reliability (Dortzbach, 1975). Similarly, high correlation with other cognitive developmental measures indicates acceptable validity (Panowitsch, 1975). In the present study, DIT questionnaires were computer scored at the Minnesota Moral Research Project. This scoring procedure precluded subjective input other than that of the respondent. Data collected included moral judgment scores at each of the levels mentioned above. This information specified a respondent's relative preference for each of the six concepts of fairness. Other scores included a score to check for random responding (consistency check), a score to check for preference for lofty sounding but meaningless moral judgment options (M score), and an experimental weighted average score (D score). In addition, an aggregate principled reasoning score (P score) was computed. This P score consisted of the sum of Stage 5 and 6 responses. In this study, this principled reasoning score, expressed as

a percentage of total possible responses, was used as the quantitative measure of a respondent's moral judgment. That score, the P%, became the numerical definition of moral development that was later related to counselor behavior. As will be shown in the statistical analysis, the distribution of P% scores was expressed in two ways; just as a mean split in order to define High moral judgment and Low moral judgment and second as a continuous variable from lowest to highest P%.

2. The Quality Score (QS)

A measure of overall quality of counseling was developed for this study. This measure, the quality score or QS, was derived in the following way. One short segment was excerpted from each counseling transcript. Each segment was of similar length and was excerpted from the middle of the complete transcript. In this way a collection of counselor behavior samples was obtained which was free of opening remarks and closing summaries. These were considered more indicative of counseling quality than any other random or chosen segment of the transcribed interview. These middle segments were then retranscribed onto sort cards. The cards were then presented to ten independent raters, who ranked the middle segments into four categories: Poor, Good, Better, and Best. The qualitative rankings were then given numerical weight (1 lowest, 4 highest) and the weights summed for each subject's segment. An average ranking was achieved by dividing this sum by 10, the number of raters. This average ranking was then devided by 4 to arrive at a QS which indicates that subject's percentage of a perfect score; that is, 10 rankings at the 4 or best level, devided by 4. Table

24 of Appendix E details these data.

The independent raters were counselors, psychotherapists or counselor educators who had appropriate academic credentials and who had practiced their professions for at least two years. The background of these raters varied widely. This variation was included by design and was intended to blunt the effects of any theoretical bias of any single rater. Inter-rater reliability of the ten raters was, therefore not at issue.

3. The Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills

The development of the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills (MTCS) has been discussed earlier in this report. The Taxonomy was used in this study as a means of getting information about counselor behavior in the analogue counseling sessions that were part of this study. Research already reviewed here indicates that the Taxonomy is clear, leaves little room for confusion about counselor skill identification, and therefore has high user reliability. In this study five minute counseling session transcripts furnished by the subjects were the source from which raw data on counselor behavior was drawn. Individual skills, aggregate skills and a focus dimension were identified and tallied. The skills were the attending and influencing skills identified separately. These skills were also scored in their respective catagories as aggregates. From among the focus options in the Taxonomy, the helpee focus was selected for identification. The raw data or tallies of these individual and aggregate skills were collected and coded according to a procedure that will be outlined next. These coded data were than

subjected to statistical analysis in relation to the subjects' moral judgment (DIT) scores.

Data Coding

As has been mentioned earlier, both the DIT and the MTCS produce quantifiable raw data suitable for statistical manipulation. What follows is a description of the procedure followed to code these numerical data so that the statistical tests used in this study could be computed.

The DIT. The P% score used in this study is the score derived when the P score is expressed as a percentage of opportunities for principled judgment responses. This score is reported from the Minnessota Moral Research Project score report. No further coding is required.

The MTCS. Data describing of counseling behavior suitable for statistical manipulation were generated in the following way. A Microskills Tally Sheet (Appendix G) was developed; it included the counselor skills in the MTCS targeted in this study. A tally sheet was attached to each subject's counseling session transcript. These were presented to a counseling psychologist familiar with the Microskills Taxonomy. At the time of the data coding, that psychologist had had over three years direct experience with the taxonomy and had taught college level counseling courses in Microtraining. The psychologist coded each of the transcripts by identifying the targeted skills and their focus and by noting them appropriately on the tally sheet. The raw data were converted into percentages. This was done in the

following ways. For hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 each skill score or skill group score was expressed as a percentage of the total number of skills used by that counselor. For example, if a counselor used fifty skills in total (irrespective of skill type) and 25 of these skills were open questions, his open questions score would be 25/50 or 50%. The only exception to this procedure was in the case of different microskills used. This aggregate skill variable was made into a continuous variable by expressing the raw score as a percentage of 11 since that is the number of separate and different microskills coded in this study.

The QS. The number reflective of the Quality Score is an average of the quality ratings of ten independent raters expressed as a percentage of a perfect score. No further coding was required for statistical manipulation designed to correlate the QS with moral judgment.

Demographic Information

For both age and counseling experience, three groups were assembled. For age, the groups were: a. less than 21 years; b. 21 years to 25 years; and c. more than 25 years. For counselor experience, the groups were: a. no experience; b. any experience to two years experience; and c. more than two years experience. This information was found in the registration materials required for the counselor training course from which the subjects were drawn.

Analysis of the data

Analysis of the data generated by these methods and procedures was statistical; tests appropriate to the nature of the data were computed. These were the coefficient of correlation for the data expressed as continuous variables, the $\underline{t}$ test when one variable was continuous and the other descrete and the chi square test when both variables were catagorical. The correlation coefficient for the two variables was computed with the pearson r statistic. For the moral judgment variable, the P% score from the Defining Issues Test was used. This is computed in the following way. There are 60 opportunities for choice of moral arguments in the long form of the DIT. The P% score indicates what percentage of these sixty opportunities the subject chose levels 5 or 6 (i.e., principled) arguments. Theoretical range of the P% score is of course 0-100%. Actual scores over diverse populations range from 10%-70%. No further manipulation is required.

Expression of the counselor behavior variable as continuous data followed a pattern similar to that used by the Minnesota group in defining the P% score. For the aggregate skill groups (i.e., attending skills and influencing skills), the focus dimension and the individual skills the number of skills demonstrated by each subject was divided by each subject's total of skills used. This is the sum of that counselor's attending skills usage and influencing skills usage. For example, if a subject used a total of 60 attending and influencing skills and 20 of these were coded as attending skills, then that subject's attending skills score was 33.3%. In the care of Hypothesis

1, different microskills used, the subject's raw score was the number of different types of skills used in the counseling session. That score can range from 1 to 11. When the subject's different microskills used score is divided by 11, a percentage results which indicates to what extent the counselor used the entire range of skills coded in this study. As explained earlier, quality score data were described as continuous data by expressing the actual average ranking for each subject as a percentage of a perfect average ranking of 4.

For the $\underline{t}$ test moral judgment scores were expressed as Hi DIT and Lo DIT using the P% score explained above. This was accomplished by the computation of the mean P% score for the sample population and the assignment of Hi DIT to those subjects whose scores fell above that mean and Lo DIT to those whose scores fell below. Results of the tests relating moral judgment and counselor behavior are presented in Chapter IV.

Summary of Chapter III, Methods

In this section the methods and procedures employed in this study of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior have been described. An overview of the study was presented as were the general premise and hypotheses to be tested. The subjects of the experiment were described. The three psychometric instruments used in this study were further defined, and their use here was outlined. These instruments are the Defining Issues Test, the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills and the Quality Score. Methods of collection, coding, and analysis of the data generated by these instruments were then reported. The results of

the hypothesis testing and the discussion of these results will be presented in Chapters IV and V respectively.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Introduction

This study began by asking the following questions:

1. Do counselor trainees who differ in their level of moral judgment conduct themselves differently in an analogue counseling interview?

2. Are there any reliable relationships between demonstrated moral judgment and counseling style?

Analysis of the theoretical and methodological framework in which these questions could be answered led to the statement of the following premise: Counselor trainees with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation different from those with lower moral judgment scores. Drawing out that general premise into researchable questions led to the seven (7) null hypotheses listed earlier. These hypotheses were tested as reported in the preceding chapter. Results of those tests of the seven null hypotheses are presented in this chapter. The following chapter will review these results and offer discussion concerning their general and specific implications and limitations.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the number of different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Two procedures were used with data derived from this hypothesis. First, the two sets of data were treated as continuous variables and analyzed for their coefficient of correlation. Second, the moral judgment scores were expressed as "high scores" if they fell above the sample mean and "low scores" if they fell below. These high and low category scores and the accompanying microskills usage scores were subjected to a $\underline{t}$ test. In neither case was a significant relationship found. The correlation coefficient was computed to be r=.08, p=.58. The $\underline{t}$ test similarly was not conclusive. The $\underline{t}$ value in that test proved to be 1.21, p=.70.. Because of these low correlations, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. A table of these data can be found in Appendic C.

Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant difference in attending skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

As with the first hypothesis, two tests were computed. Again, they were the coefficient of correlation and the $\underline{t}$ test. To accommodate these two tests the data were expressed as continuous or discrete as appropriate.

The coefficient of correlation of these data was computed to be r=.28, p=.26. The $\underline{t}$ test computed with these data expressed as high and low moral judgment and attending skills usage yielded similar

results. This test produced an $\underline{t}$ value of 1.68, p=.29. These data, although not statistically significant, may describe a weak positive directional trend toward a relationship between attending skills used and moral judgment score attained. Rest (1979) indicates that such indications of a trend can sometimes be strengthened by improving the research design and experimental procedures. Additional research with attending skills and moral judgment employing more controlled methods and a larger sample may yield moral conclusive results. A table of these data can be found in Appendix C.

Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant difference in influencing skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The coefficient of correlation and the $\underline{t}$ test were computed on the data in the same manner as in the preceding hypotheses; that is, the data sets were treated as continuous or as discrete variables as appropriate. With this hypothesis, the coefficient of correlation between influencing skill usage and DIT score proved to be -.17, p=.27. The $\underline{t}$ test done on these data, expressed as high and low DIT scores and influencing skill usage, did not, however, yield results even within the expanded range of interest mentioned in hypothesis 2. With this test, the $\underline{t}$ value was 1.51, p=.40. Given these two results, rejection of the null hypothesis is clearly inappropriate. A table of these data can be found in Appendix C.

Hypothesis 4: There will be no significant difference in the use of the focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Both a coefficient of correlation and a $\underline{t}$ test were computed. Results of the former indicate that the coefficient of correlation between the two variables is .35. This correlation is significant at p=.02. This correlation is within the conventional confidence interval of 5% chance occurrence, indicating that counselors who score higher on the Defining Issues Test will tend to use more helpee focused microskills and that those who score lower will tend to use fewer. With this test, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Similar significance was not found when the DIT data were expressed categorically as "high" and "low" DIT scores. The microskills usage was expressed continuously as before. With this test, no significance was achieved. The $\underline{t}$ value proved to be 1.21, p=.67. With this $\underline{t}$ test, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Discussion of these conflicting results will be presented in the next chapter of this report. A table of these data is presented in Appendix C.

Hypothesis 5: There will be no significant difference in specific microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The coefficient of correlation and the $\underline{t}$ test were computed on usage of each of eleven specific microskills and on moral judgment. The specific microskills used were open questions, closed questions, minimal encourages, paraphrase, reflection of feelings, summaries, directions,

expressions of content, expressions of feeling, self-disclosure, and interpretation. Moral judgment was defined as the P% score on the Defining Issues Test. As can be seen from Table 6, only the skill paraphrase approaches significance when related to moral judgment. Self-disclosure achieves significance on the t test but is negatively correlated with moral judgment when subjected to the coefficient of correlation procedure. This contradictory result may center around sampling error and will be addressed in the next chapter. A directional trend as defined earlier may appear with the use of reflection of feelings, p = .27. Expression of content, expressions of feeling, paraphrase interpretation, and self-disclosure all have conflicting results when the two tests are seen together. Correspondingly, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

TABLE 6

Single skill correlation with the DIT

	Correlation Coefficient with P% score		t test with Hi DIT & Lo DIT	
	r=	p=	t=	p=
closed questions	.04	.77	1.63	.32
open questions	.01	.94	1.06	.87
minimal encourages	.06	.68	1.54	.40
paraphrases	.28	.07	1.38	.47
reflections of feeling	.14	.36	1.65	.27
summaries	.14	.31	1.31	.58
directions	.11	.46	1.56	.32
expressions of content	-.13	.41	1.72	.27
expressions of feeling	-.18	.24	1.33	.56
self disclosure	-.21	.18	7.85	.01
interpretations	.01	.92	1.99	.13

A table describing the data from which the above results were obtained is located in Appendix C.

For Hypothesis 5, an additional test of relationship was computed in order to expand the general limits of the parameter analysis used in this report. In this test the 11 microskills were collapsed into two catagorical groups. These were the attending skills and the influencing skills. A 2x2 chi square analysis was computed using these two skill groups, Hi DIT and Lo DIT. The following matrix illustrates this analysis.

	ATTENDING	INFLUENCING	
Hi DIT	374	45	419
Lo DIT	437	105	542
	811	150	961

This analysis produced a chi square of 13.39, significant at greater than the .01 level of significance. This result indicates an association between high and low moral judgment and differential use of attending skills and influencing skills.

Hypothesis 6: There will be no significant difference in overall quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Previous research (Sheehan, 1979) has demonstrated that supervisors' reports of quality practice are significantly related to moral judgment score among pediatric residents. The hypothesis explored here investigates a similar pairing. In this case, the quality

of each counselor's counseling interventions is determined by 10 independent raters, and the moral judgment of those counselors is determined by the Defining Issues Test. The expectation here is that counseling quality relates directly to counselor moral judgment. Statistical analysis of the data by pearson r correlation coeficient did not provide any confident predictability of counseling quality, from moral judgment ($p=.67$). Further analysis by t test similarly found no significant relationship $t=-1.24$, $p=.22$. Analysis by scatterplot (see Appendix B) shows groupings that might suggest a trend in the direction of a direct relationship. Future research investigating this link between counseling quality and counselor moral judgment may enhance this speclative finding. For the purposes of this report, however, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. A table of the Quality Score data is found in Appendix D.

Hypothesis 7: There will be no sex differences or age differences or level of counseling experience difference between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

These data were subjected to a t test to determine possible relationships between the variables. Results are presented in the following table.

TABLE 7

Sex, age and experience correlations with the DIT

	t=	p=
Sex	1.54	.67
Age	.153	.05*
Experience	.25	.78

* Since significant results have not occurred in this experiment, the significance of this result must be viewed with suspicion and may be an artifact of the statistical procedure and itself a result of chance significance. This notion is further indicated - due to the preponderance of subjects 19-22 years old.

Summary of Chapter IV Results

The tests of the seven hypotheses yield mixed and at times contradictory results. No significant relationships were found between moral judgment as demonstrated by the Defining Issues Test and specific counselor behavior as described by the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. Findings from the experiment indicate only that directional trends toward such a relationship may exist between the two variables measured. Two exceptions did occur: There appears to be a relationship between the use of helpee focused skills and counselor moral judgment. The relationship is evidenced when the data are subjected to the correlation coefficient statistic. When analyzed using the t test however, these variables do not prove to be related. The statistical significance of the relationship in this case may be a chance occurrence itself. Further study of the variable will determine which explanation is more accurate.

The other exception is the positive relationship between moral judgment and age. This relationship has been demonstrated in the past (Rest, 1979; Kohlberg, 1973; Colby, 1979) but its demonstration in the present experiment is suspect since the age spread of the subject population is very narrow. This relationship, too, may be due to chance. The following chapter will discuss these findings in greater detail, address limitations of this research, and suggest modifications for future replications.

As expected by research already mentioned (Rest, 1979), sex is not a factor related to moral judgment. Counseling experience level does

not appear to be related to moral judgment. From these results, the null hypothesis is rejected insofar as the relationship between age and moral judgment is concerned but not insofar as sex and counseling experience is concerned.

Graphic representation of the results of this experiment in the form of scatter plots are presented in Appendix B. These scatter plots display a trend toward a relationship between moral judgment and counselor behavior in several pairings of the variables.

Collapsing specific data into catagories yielded one significant result. This procedure necessitated a nonparametric analysis. Results of that analysis indicate that some association exists between Hi and Lo moral judgment and the differential usage of attending and influencing skills. No further information is afforded by this analysis.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Introduction

The general premise of this thesis from which the seven hypotheses were drawn was stated earlier in the following terms: Counselor trainees with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation different from those with lower moral judgment scores. To facilitate discussion and to make the results of this study more meaningful in counseling and counselor education, this premise will be stated more specifically as follows: Counselor trainees who are more advanced along the moral development continuum will coincidentally be more advanced as counseling practitioners. Operationally, the two variables of this more specific premise will be defined as follows:

1. Advancement along the moral development continuum equates with greater use of principled moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test.

2. Advancement as a counseling practitioner equates with a greater variety of skills used, use of skills considered more advanced by trainers, more use of helpee focused skills, higher rating by independent raters and greater level of experience.

Ideally, a clear positive significant concordance between these two variables would have been the result of the experimental manipulation described earlier. Clearly this concordance was not demonstrated by the

results presented in the previous chapter. The present chapter will discuss the meaning and implication of those results from the perspective of what was expected and what actually occurred.

Presented first will be a summary of the findings. Following that summary will be a discussion of those findings, including problems in the research that may have precluded conclusive results from surfacing. A discussion of implications that emanate from the research follows. Recommendations resulting from these implications will conclude the chapter. A summary of the entire study will be presented as the final chapter.

Summary of findings

Hypothesis 1. No relationship was found between moral judgment and different microskills used.

Hypothesis 2. No relationship was found between moral judgment and attending skills usage.

Hypothesis 3. No relationship was found between moral judgment and influencing skills usage.

Hypothesis 4. A significant relationship was found between moral judgment and the use of helpee focused skills when subjected to the correlation coefficient; no significant relationship was found between the variables when subjected to the t test.

Hypothesis 5. No single skill is significantly related to moral judgment. Only paraphrase approaches significance in its relationship to moral judgment. Chi square analysis

indicates a significant association between Hi DIT and Lo DIT and the attending skills and the influencing skills when these skills are presented as catagories attending skills and influencing skills rather than as the 11 separate skills.

Hypothesis 6. No significant relationship was found between the quality score and moral judgment.

Hypothesis 7. Moral judgment is related to the age of the counselor trainees but not to their sex or level of experience.

Discussion of the findings

Research seeking to relate moral judgment and behavior of any kind has inherent in it a host of problems. Some of these problems were outlined in Chapter 2. The research reported on in this thesis faces these same problems. Furthermore, this research faces another set of problems associated with describing and quantifying the complex behavior of counseling. The data reported in the previous chapter and summarized in this chapter indicate perhaps that both of these sets of problems have come together to allow for less than conclusive results. Additionally, instrumentation and structure present certain limitations. The Microcounseling Taxonomy used here, for example, has three important limitations as a test for describing counselor behavior: a. as used here the instrument is a quantification tool and generally delimits qualitative information, b. the instrument gathers information through the use of written transcripts and consequently does not incorporate

vocal inflection, emotional components, and most nonverbal data, and c. the instrument contains a finite number of skills catagories and disallows the creative development of novel skills. The DIT is similarly limited for measuring moral judgment because it relies on self-reports of proposed action, relies on reading ability and makes no allowances for responses that result from imitation of moral argument rather than from true understanding.

Three additonal limitations are structural: a. the sample is narrow regarding sex age and experience and small in number, b. the trainees demonstrate a low level of clinical ability; sophisticated counselor skills are therefore poorly represented in the data, and c. the interviews varied widely regarding content.

Notwithstanding these limitations, however, certain conclusions can be drawn. A discussion of each of the seven hypothesis tests will be presented next.

Hypothesis 1: There will be no significant difference in the manner of different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

It is well known by educators and practicioners in applied psychology that variety of response mode can be a characteristic of successful counseling. Without that variety, many believe, the interaction becomes stale, predictable and can lose therapeutic impact. The first hypothesis of this thesis was directed at investigating this characteristic as it might be related to moral judgment. As was stated above, results of testing the hypothesis do not indicate any significant

relationship between the two variables.

Significant results were expected based on the belief that higher quality (i.e., more varied) counseling would be practiced by those trainees who were more advanced in moral judgment. Research with pediatric residents (Sheehan, 1979) found this quality/moral judgment link to be clear and highly significant. Similar findings were expected to result among counselor trainees.

Problems that may have been responsible for the difficulty and the present failure to find a variety of response mode/moral judgment links, if in fact such links exist, may be the result of internal experimental flaws. Two likely prospects for these flaws are sample characteristics and the nature of the interviews from which the counselor behavior was drawn. In a replication of this study, more advanced trainees should be used. If subjects were counselor interns rather than novice counselors the sample population would more closely resemble Sheehan's sample. Similarly, conclusive results may be more readily obtainable if longer, more clinical interviews were coded.

Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant difference in attending skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

In this hypothesis, attending skills were parceled out of the skills sample for each subject. The resultant attending skills score was then related to the moral judgment score. The parceling out process was justified because in certain circumstances, attending skills alone can

account for quality counseling. These circumstances include initial interview and low-to-moderate emotional level in the concerns presented (Ivey, 1979, personal communication). These characteristics were present in the interviews used in this study. Hence, the expected result of relating attending skills and moral judgment score was that increased attending skills usage would parallel moral judgment score. A trend in the direction did appear to occur in the data. Yet no significant relationship was found.

An enhancement of the relationship might occur if more experienced trainees constituted the sample. Similarly, more conclusive findings might result if longer, more clinically oriented interviews were coded.

Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant difference in influencing skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

According to the theory and practice of the Microcounseling training system, increased influencing skills usage indicates more advanced counseling behavior. The link between influencing skills usage and moral judgment was expected to be significant. Theoretical speculations of the general premise might predict that a weak but significant relationship could exist between attending skills usage and moral judgment while a stronger significant relationship could exist between influencing skills usage and moral judgment. This speculation is predicated on the idea that trainees more advanced in counseling skills usage (i.e., those using more of the higher order influencing skills) could coincidentally be more advanced along the moral judgment

continuum. If so, this finding would conform to results in the study of pediatric residents cited above. However, in the case of a relationship between moral judgment and influencing skills usage, no relationship was found. It can be concluded that no relationship exists or that the internal experimental flaws mentioned earlier are operant in this hypothesis testing. If the latter conclusion holds, an explanation of the lack of any demonstrated relationship between these two theoretically related variables follows the same path as explanations for weak results given earlier. These include:

1. Longer sample interviews are required.
2. The interviews should be more clinically oriented.
3. More advanced counselor trainees should participate in the study.

Inclusion of these three changes in the structure of the experiment may favor more meaningful results in a test for a relationship between influencing skill usage and moral judgment.

Hypothesis 4: There will be no significant difference in the use of the "Helpee" focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Helpee focused skills are those that refer directly to the client. They are thought to assist the client in expressing his/her needs, feelings values, and so on. This notion is based on the general research in client-centered therapy and in particular in the work of Carl Rogers (1951). Extensions within the microtraining system appear to bear this out (Ivey & Authier, 1978). Within both the client-

centered model and the Microcounseling system, therefore, the use of helpee focused skills implies that the counselor accepts the validity of the client's understanding of the problem presented. Such acceptance corresponds roughly to Piaget's theoretical principle of reciprocity. That is, the counselor demonstrates, with his/her helpee focused skills usage, an appreciation of the client's perception of his/her problems, values the client's perception, and legitimizes the client's right to those perceptions. This style of interaction characterizes Piaget's autonomous stage, Kohlberg's universal ethical principles orientation and Rest's stages 5 and 6 as adaptations of the work of both Piaget and Kohlberg. The investigation of the helpee focused skills usage therefore was expected to provide clear results. Results obtained were not clear, however. As mentioned earlier, a significant relationship was found between helpee focused skills and moral judgment when the data were subjected to the correlation coefficient test but not significant when subjected to a $\underline{t}$ test. These two results may differ because of the two statistics or the actual lack of relationship between the two variables. Again, a replication of the study should pay close attention to sample characteristics outlined above. Explanation of this and similar conflicting results based on the statistics used may involve the following: As a test of significance the correlation coefficient is more sensitive than the $\underline{t}$ test since the former uses actual scores while the latter weakens its effect by using mean scores. This is known as the attenuation-of-range effect. It occurs when a continuous variable is dichotomized. In this case the continuous variable of the P% score was

dichotomized into Hi DIT and Lo DIT. Dichotomized data such as these yield correlations lower than those found when the entire range of data is analyzed. Lower correlations result from the dramatic reduction in the variation of the variable inherent in dicotomization. In studies, such as this one, that yield wide ranging continuous scores, the correlation coefficient alone may be the better test of significance.

Hypothesis 5: There will be no significant difference in specific microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

This test was an attempt to see if the use of any specific skill could be isolated as a result of high association with moral judgment score. This test can be seen as the opposite of the first test, which looked at the variety of skills used. No reliable relationships were found in the data. Although "paraphrase" correlated significantly with moral judgment, the relationship is suspect because "reflection of feeling," a very similar skill, did not even approach any meaningful relationship. Single skill predominance therefore does not appear to relate to moral judgment.

The additional analysis using the chi square statistic proved more fruitful. Results from that test indicate a significant association between moral judgment and counselor skills usage when the latter are collapsed into the two skill groups attending and influencing skills. This result is in accord with the intuitive notion that differential usage of counselor skills would indicate differential moral judgment score or vice versa. As a non parametric analysis, however, no more

information about the relationship is afforded. Yet, the conclusive result, however lacking in information about degree or direction of association does indicate that the more powerful parametric tests otherwised employed in this study may yet provide meaningful results after internal refinements to the research design and methodology are made.

Hypothesis 6: There will be no significant difference in overall quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

This hypothesis explored relationships between overall quality of counseling and counselor moral judgment. The hypothesis did not employ the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills to define counselor behavior. In place of that tool a measure of judging overall quality of counseling was devised. This measure analyzed counselor behavior through the expert ratings method. A full description of this procedure appears in Chapter III of this report. The tool was used here in order to investigate the possibility that a method of counselor behavior analysis different from the separate skills approach used in the other hypotheses might provide different results. This different result did not occur. No statistically significant relationship was found between expert ratings and moral judgment. Since the ratings were completely subjective, the explanation for the lack of relationship differs from explanations for nonsignificance given earlier.

Strengths of the method include the following: a. the sample

interviews were long enough for analysis by the experts, b. although quite varied, the interviews allowed for internal comparison, and c. the variety of backgrounds in the rater group negates any charge of bias that might have been leveled at the Microcounseling approach.

Weaknesses of the method include the following: a. raters may have been unfamiliar with evaluation of counselor behavior from transcripts, b. raters may have been unfamiliar with various interviewing styles, and c. raters may have become uninterested or fatigued given the volume of reading involved.

Analysis of data from this hypothesis was by pearson r correlation coeficient and by $\underline{t}$ test. In neither analysis was a significant relationship found between the variables.

Hypothesis 7: There will be no sex differences or age differences or level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

The sex of the subject was found to have no apparent relationship to moral judgment. This outcome is consistent with theoretical expectations, since neither moral judgment nor counseling effectiveness has been predictable from the sex of the counselor. Future research may include age and experienced matched pairs of male and female subjects to investigate this more carefully.

More definitive information has surfaced by pairing age and moral judgment. This result is also consistent with previous research and theoretical expectations. Yet caution must be exercised with respect to this finding. Since the age of the sample population was heavily

represented by younger subjects, the sample may be too narrow for meaningful analysis. The statistical significance may be a chance occurrence. Further study will explore this possibility and may profit by finding a sample that includes subjects from the various ages of counselors and/or trainees.

Level of counseling experience was expected to be related to moral judgment for two reasons: a. age and experience are usually related and b. more experience in counseling practice implies a wider range of exposure to diverse moral arguments. These expectations were not realized through manipulation of the data available to this study. The lack of relationship between experience as a counselor and moral judgment may be accounted for by design flaws. These flaws may be remedied by incorporating the recommendations mentioned earlier in this text. If replications still fail to find the expected relationships and if design flaws are ruled out, then the relationship between counselor moral judgment and counselor professional behavior must be questioned. Implications of this conclusion are presented in Chapter VI of this report. This argument centers on questions about the basic raison d'etre of counseling as a personal and professional activity and as a purposeful and defensible force in society.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Introduction

The questions associated with the introduction of counselor moral values into the therapy process is not new and is now receiving renewed attention. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of relationships that may exist between the moral judgment of counselor trainees and the behavior exhibited by those trainees in an analogue counseling interview.

Two considerations have motivated this research. The first is a renewed discussion of counselors' values in applied psychology. The discusion questions both the advisability and the possibility of achieving value freedom in psychotherapeutic interactions. The second consideration motivating this research springs from speculations surrounding this discussion. These speculations concern the advisability and the possibility, not of achieving value freedom in counseling, but of achieving its converse -- maximizing value advocacy.

These two sets of questions have a significant recent history. London's (1967) and Lowe's (1976) works characterize well written and thoughtful examples of a scholarly and dispassionate approach to the documentation of the involvement of personal values in psychological counseling. Others (Ivey, 1980; Senour, 1982) personalize their approach and call for individual action directed to produce wide and pervasive effects on clients as well as on social institutions. Still others,

(Carkuff, 1972; Sue, 1977; Gordon, 1976) single out particular social concerns with a corresponding call for specific advocacy. These include, among others, the aims of humanism and the eradication of sexism and racism.

These discussions taken together constitute a renewed dialogue focusing on the issues involved with incorporating the personal values of the counselor into the practice of counseling. The study summarized here is an attempt to begin research in this area at a truly fundamental level in a controlled experimental format. Given that goal, two basic variables were isolated: a. counselor moral values and b. trainee behavior in a demonstration counseling interview. Relationships found between these two, it was thought, would help develop a basic understanding of the involvement of the personal values of the counselor in the counseling interation.

Background research for this study

No research has been completed that investigates the relationship between the moral values of counselors and the behavior that counselors display in counseling interviews. One study (Sheehan, 1979) has looked at the relationship between moral judgment -- defined as a subject's methods of choosing right and wrong -- and quality of performance among pediatric residents. This study used an instrument known as The Defining Issues Test (DIT) to quantify the former of these variables and supervisors reports to quantify the latter. Results indicated that moral judgment as measured along a continuum defined by the DIT related significantly to supervisory reports.

The present study is similar to the Sheehan study in that the source of moral judgment data was the Defining Issues Test. This test is a paper and pencil survey seeking to define the percentages of use of moral arguments coded at the three levels and six stages of moral judgment postulated by Kohlberg (1958, 1976). These levels and stages are:

Level 1. The Preconventional level: The good is what I like and want.

Stage 1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded bad is punished.

Stage 2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is equated

Level 2. The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's social order.

Stage 3. The interpersonal concordance or "good boy" - "nice girl" orientation. I do what family and society expect of me in order to be good.

Stage 4. Law and Order: Good is defined as adherence to the fixed rules and laws of society.

Level 3. The Postconventional, autonomous or principles level.

Stage 5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good (right) is what is constitutionally and democratically agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the good.

Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation: The right is defined by appeal to accepted and self chosen ethical principles characterized by universality and consistency.

Validity and reliability of the DIT as an instrument for gathering these data have been extensively researched (Rest, 1979). Using the instrument, the data are presented in a form that allows a base of statistical manipulation. Broad validity, reliability, ease of manipulation, and other reasons have led to the use of the DIT in this study of counselor moral judgment and counselor professional behavior.

The second variable, counselor professional behavior, was analyzed using the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This instrument capitalizes on the theoretical framework basic to the Microcounseling Training System (Ivey et al., 1968, 1978). This training paradigm is based on the notion that counseling behavior is a subtle interplay of observable and definable behavioral bits or counseling skills. The tabulation of these skills as they are represented in effective counseling constitutes the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This taxonomy was used in this study as the method for describing counselor trainee behavior. Of the complete taxonomy, the following 11 skills and the helpee focus dimension were chosen for analysis in the present study.

THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE SKILLS

A. The microtraining skills.

Attending skills:

1. CLOSED QUESTIONS. Most often begin with "do," "is," "are" and can be answered by the helpee with only a few words.
2. OPEN QUESTIONS. Typically begin with "what," "how," "why," or "could" and allow the helpee more room for self-exploration.
3. MINIMAL ENCOURAGE. Selective attention to and repetition back to the helpee of exact words or phrases. May also be represented by "Tell me more..." or "Uh-huh."

4. PARAPHRASE. Gives back to the helpee the essence of past verbal statements. Selective attention to key content of helpee verbalizations.
5. REFLECTION OF FEELING. Selective attention to key affective or emotional aspects of helpee behavior.
6. SUMMARIZATION. Similar to paraphrase and reflection of feeling but represents a longer time period and gives back to client several strands of thinking.

Influencing skills.

7. DIRECTIONS. Telling the helper or helpees what to do.
8. EXPRESSION OF CONTENT. Giving advice, sharing information, making suggestions, giving opinions.
9. EXPRESSION OF FEELING. Sharing personal or other people's affective state in the interview.
10. SELF-DISCLOSURE. The helper's "I" statement. What the helper thinks, feels, or has experienced pertinent to the counseling interview.
11. INTERPRETATION. Renaming or relabeling the helpee's behavior or verbalizations with new words from a new frame of reference.

B. Focus dimension. The main theme or subject of the helpee or helper's sentence often determines what either individual will speak about next.
HELPEE. The helper's statement focuses on the client. May be demonstrated by the helper using the client's name or the personal pronoun "you." In the case of the helpee, this focus is generally manifested by an "I" statement.

(Adapted From Ivey & Authier, 1978, pp. 67-68)

Information gathered about the moral judgment of the counselor trainees and those trainees' counseling behavior was then analyzed to uncover relationships that may be useful to future researchers as they attempt to answer the general and specific questions surrounding the interface of counselor values and counseling practice.

Experimental procedures

Method. The subjects were 40 male and female undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory course in counseling theory and practice at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the Spring of

1980. Subject participation was voluntary. To generate data on these subjects' moral judgment level, the Defining Issues Test was presented as a take home assignment. Within three weeks their DIT protocols were collected and objectively scored by the Minnesota Moral Research Project at the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis. Through this procedure each subject received a score that revealed the degree to which he/she favored moral arguments characterized as principled level (i.e., Stages 5 and 6 in the Kohlberg formulation) in the stimulus dilemmas. The behavioral variable was quantified using the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This quantification was accomplished in the following way. As a part of the expected work for the introductory course, each student prepared an audio tape of a five minute counseling interview. Transcripts of these interviews were prepared and collected. The transcripts were presented to a professional Microcounseling trainer for coding. Coding is straightforward. Each counselor lead is analyzed for its identifying type as defined in the taxonomy. These leads are semantically specific and clearly defined. Information so gathered then provides a descriptive analysis of each subject's counseling behavior. This includes a set of scores reflective of each subject's use of the 11 microskills addressed in this study.

These 11 skills were analyzed both as attending skills and influencing skills and as separate skills. Additionally, the focus of the skills was considered. Singled out for study here was the Helpee focus option. Helpee focused skills are those that address themselves directly to the client rather than to some other person, the counselor,

the context, or the environment.

A further consideration of counselor behavior was made by appraising the overall quality of the interview. This was done by ten (10) disinterested psychological practitioners. Each read the transcripts and rated each one on a four-level scale of poor to very good. Averaged, these ten ratings produced a Quality Score for each subject. This also was related to moral judgment.

Manipulation of the data generated using the DIT, the MTCS, and the Quality Score was determined by the seven hypotheses tested in the study. These hypotheses resulted from original research speculations that brought forth a general premise. The general premise and the hypotheses follow: Counselor trainers with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation different from those with lower moral judgment scores.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the number of different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in attending skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in influencing skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in specific microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in overall quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Hypothesis 7: There are no sex differences or age differences or level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test.

Analysis of the data was statistical. Relationships between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior were sought using the coefficient of correlation and the $\underline{t}$ test. One additional chi square analysis was computed, results of these procedures are presented next.

Results

Others who have done research on the effects of moral values on behavior have cautioned that results can often be disappointing. In this study few truly conclusive results were obtained. Only results suggestive of various trends and possible directions for future research were found. A summary of the results of each hypothesis test is presented below.

Summary of findings

Hypothesis 1. No relationship was found between moral judgment and different microskills used.

Hypothesis 2. No relationship was found between moral judgment and attending skills usage.

Hypothesis 3. No relationship was found between moral judgment and influencing skills usage.

Hypothesis 4. A significant relationship was found between moral judgment and the use of helpee focused skills when subjected to the correlation coefficient; no significant relationship was found between the variables when subjected to the $\underline{t}$ test.

Hypothesis 5. No single skill is significantly related to moral judgment. Only paraphrase approaches significance in its relationship to moral judgment. Chi square analysis indicates a significant association between Hi DIT and Lo DIT and the attending skills and the influencing skills when these skills are presented as catagories attending skills and influencing skills rather than as the eleven separate skills.

Hypothesis 6. No significant relationship was found between the quality score and moral judgment.

Hypothesis 7. Moral judgment is related to the age of the counselor trainees but not to their sex or level of experience.

Discussion of findings

The many difficulties inherent in research that seeks to define relationships between moral judgment and behavior have been well documented. This study, like others investigating these complex relationships, also faces these difficulties. Additionally, this investigation faces the similarly troublesome, well known problems surrounding attempts to define counseling behavior. The results obtained in this study reflect these problems. Implications drawn from these results therefore must follow a suggestive rather than conclusive path.

Implications

Issues that have motivated this research, coupled with the lack of conclusive findings strongly favor broad rather than specific implications. The most basic of these centers around the issue of defining the reason for the failure to find conclusive relationsips between so many pairs of seemingly related variables. Two theoretical possibilities exist: a. the research is theoretically and/or methodologically flawed and b. no relationship actually exists. The first possibility indicates a need for structural changes in the research and subsequent replications of the study. Should these replications demonstrate a clear concordance between counselor trainee moral judgment and counselor trainee behavior, then conclusions and implications can be drawn from those data.

The second possibility generates a new set of questions and implications. These center around very basic issues concerning what part, if any, moral judgment and personal values in general should play in counseling. In the largest sense these questions and implications result from an acceptance of the conclusions that moral judgment and professional behavior are not linked in the practice of counseling; they also challenge what counseling is as both a professional and a personal activity. The "no relationship" explanation brings into sharp focus philosophical issues and questions underlying applied psychology. In short, this explanation forces psychological theoreticians to ask if the lack of relationship is appropriate, desirable, or tolerable.

The point of view expressed both overtly and as an underlying theme of this research is that a lack of a demonstrable relationship between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior is indeed an undesirable occurance. Further, it is maintained here that we as professional counselors owe our clients, ourselves our profession, and our society more than this "no relationship" explanation affords. It is maintained here that a meaningful convergence between authentic moral values of counselors and the authentic behavior of counselors is a professionally sound imperative of training, theory, and practice.

If, in replications of this study, no reliable relationships between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior can be demonstrated, then steps must be taken to assure that a relationship will obtain among future professionals. Selection of trainees, appropriate moral/values training, and meaningful field placements are suggested as avenues for this assurance. Failing this effort,

counseling may continue to be an activity largely characterized by a haphazard and indistinct values structure and may continue to include many professionals who remain only bystanders in the march of civilization.

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Appendix A: The Defining Issues Test

OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several stories. Here is a story as an example.

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. Below there is a list of some of these questions.

If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding what car to buy?

Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question)

On the left hand side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. (For instance, if you think that statement #1 is not important in making a decision about buying a car, check the space on the right.)

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
				✓	1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample, the person taking the questionnaire did not think this was important in making a decision.)
✓					2. Would a *used* car be more economical in the long run than a *new* car. (Note that a check was put in the far left space to indicate the opinion that this is an important issue in making a decision about buying a car.)
		✓			3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
				✓	4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200. (Note that if you are unsure about what "cubic inch displacement" means, then mark it "no importance.")
✓					5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
				✓	6. Whether the front connibilies were differential. (Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it "no importance.")

Instructions for Part B: (Sample Question)

From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd and 4th most important choices. (Note that the top choices in this case will come from the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side—statements #2 and #5 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the *most* important, a person would re-read #2 and #5, and then pick one of them as the *most* important, then put the other one as "second most important," and so on.)

MOST	2ND MOST IMPORTANT	3RD MOST IMPORTANT	4TH MOST IMPORTANT
5	2	3	1

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)

_____Should steal it _____Can't decide _____Should not steal it

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
					2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?
					3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?
					4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
					5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.
					6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.
					7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.
					8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other.
					9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow.
					10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.
					11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.
					12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____ Second most important _____

Third most important _____ Fourth most important _____

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

STUDENT TAKE-OVER

At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), believe that the University should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees.

Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.

So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the university's administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.

Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one)

____Yes, they should take it over ____Can't decide ____No, they shouldn't take it over

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Are the students doing this to really help other people or are they doing it just for kicks?
					2. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them?
					3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
					4. Would taking over the building in the long run benefit more people to a greater extent?
					5. Whether the president stayed withing the limits of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote.
					6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all students a bad name?
					7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
					8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage many other student take-overs?
					9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative.
					10. Whether running the university ought to be in the hands of a few administrators or in the hands of all the people.
					11. Are the students following principles which they believe are above the law?
					12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be respected by students.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important_____ Second most important_____

Third most important_____ Fourth most important_____

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? (Check one)

_____Should report him _____Can't decide _____Should not report him

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person?
					2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime?
					3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal systems?
					4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?
					5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect?
					6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man?
					7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison?
					8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off?
					9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?
					10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances?
					11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?
					12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important_____ Second most important_____

Third most important_____ Fourth most important _____

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA

A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

What should the doctor do? (Check one)

_____He should give the lady an overdose that will make her die _____Can't decide _____Should not give the overdose

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving her the overdose or not.
					2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her.
					3. Whether people would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths.
					4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident.
					5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live.
					6. What is the value of death prior to society's perspective on personal values.
					7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's suffering or cares more about what society might think.
					8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation.
					9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end.
					10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior.
					11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to.
					12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important_____ Second most important_____

Third most important_____ Fourth most important_____

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

WEBSTER

Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.

When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee.

What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one)

_____ Should have hired Mr. Lee _____ Can't decide _____ Should not have hired him

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make his own business decisions or not?
					2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimination in hiring for jobs.
					3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against orientals himself or whether he means nothing personal in refusing the job.
					4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention to his customers' wishes would be best for his business.
					5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how society's roles are filled?
					6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic system ought to be completely abandoned.
					7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society feel like his customers or are a majority against prejudice?
					8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
					9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs?
					10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee?
					11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man applies in this case.
					12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped regardless of what you get back from him?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____ Second most important _____

Third most important _____ Fourth most important _____

APPENDIX A, (Cont.)

NEWSPAPER

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)

_____ Should stop it _____ Can't decide _____ Should not stop it

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to the parents?
					2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time
					3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped the newspaper?
					4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right to give orders to students?
					5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say "no" in this case?
					6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing full discussion of important problems?
					7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose faith in the principal.
					8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and patriotic to his country.
					9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the student's education in critical thinking and judgments?
					10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing his own opinions.
					11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in the school.
					12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important_____ Second most important_____

Third most important_____ Fourth most important_____

APPENDIX B

Figure 3



Scatterplot of Different Microskills and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 4



Scatterplot of Attending Skills and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 5



Scatterplot of Influencing Skills and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 6



Scatterplot of Helpee Focused Skills and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 7



Scatterplot of Open Questions and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 8



Scatterplot of Closed Questions and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 9



Scatterplot of Minimal Encourages and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 10



Scatterplot of Reflections of Feeling and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 11



Scatterplot of Paraphrases and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 12



Scatterplot of Summaries and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 13



Scatterplot of Self Disclosures and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 14



Scatterplot of Interpretations and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 15



Scatterplot of Directions and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 16



Scatterplot of Expressions of Content and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 17



Scatterplot of Expressions of Feeling and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 18



Scatterplot of Quality Score and P% Score

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 19



Scatterplot of Age and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 20



Scatterplot of Sex and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

Figure 21



Scatterplot of Experience and P% Score

Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc

APPENDIX C

DIT Scores Paired with Aggregate and individual Skill Usage Scores

TABLE 8

DIT Scores and Different Microskills Used.

ID	P%	No. of Different Skills Used	No. of Skills Available	% Skills Available
1	43.3	10	11	0.91
2	43.3	8	11	0.73
3	65	5	11	0.45
4	41.7	3	11	0.27
6	33.3	5	11	0.45
7	23.3	5	11	0.45
9	45.5	6	11	0.55
11	40	6	11	0.55
12	55	8	11	0.73
13	41	7	11	0.64
14	53.3	4	11	0.36
15	36.7	5	11	0.45
16	48.3	5	11	0.45
18	38.3	6	11	0.55
19	51.7	8	11	0.73
21	33.3	6	11	0.55
24	75	6	11	0.55
25	41.7	7	11	0.64
26	51.7	4	11	0.36
27	61.7	4	11	0.36
28	50	7	11	0.64
29	51.7	5	11	0.45
31	75	4	11	0.36
32	56.7	2	11	0.18
34	48.3	5	11	0.45
35	45.8	9	11	0.82
49	51.7	6	11	0.55
41	63.3	7	11	0.64
42	40	5	11	0.45
43	33.3	3	11	0.27
44	46.7	8	11	0.73
45	45	7	11	0.64
46	71.7	7	11	0.64
48	31.7	7	11	0.64
49	66.7	8	11	0.73
52	33.3	7	11	0.64
53	63.3	10	11	0.91
54	61.7	8	11	0.73
55	35	3	11	0.27
56	38.3	3	11	0.27

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

DIT Score and Attending Skills Used

(Hyothesis 2)

TABLE 9

ID	P%	No. of Attending Skills Used	Total Number of Skils Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	15	28	0.54
2	43.3	18	26	0.69
3	65	18	18	1.00
4	41.7	16	16	1.00
6	33.3	43	58	0.74
7	23.3	38	42	0.90
9	45.5	10	11	0.91
11	40	11	17	0.65
12	55	13	21	0.62
13	41	19	29	0.66
14	53.3	12	13	0.92
15	36.7	22	22	1.00
16	48.3	21	22	0.95
18	38.3	21	21	1.00
19	51.7	32	23	1.39
21	33.3	15	20	0.75
24	75	76	15	5.07
25	41.7	26	82	0.32
26	51.7	10	29	0.34
27	61.7	16	10	1.60
28	50	18	16	1.13
29	51.7	17	23	0.74
31	75	22	18	1.22
32	56.7	18	22	0.82
34	48.3	18	18	1.00
35	45.8	10	11	0.91
49	51.7	20	29	0.69
41	63.3	15	18	0.83
42	40	12	18	0.67
43	33.3	23	23	1.00
44	46.7	12	12	1.00
45	45	13	16	0.81
46	71.7	18	19	0.95
48	31.7	23	26	0.88
49	66.7	25	26	0.96
52	33.3	19	25	0.76
53	63.3	33	34	0.97
54	61.7	15	18	0.83
55	35	23	26	0.88
56	38.3	10	10	1.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

DIT Scores and Influencing Skills Used

TABLE 10

(Hypothesis 3)

ID	P%	No. of Inluencing Skills Used	Total Number of Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	13	28	0.46
2	43.3	8	26	0.31
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	15	58	0.26
7	23.3	4	42	0.10
9	45.5	1	11	0.09
11	40	6	17	0.35
12	55	9	21	0.43
13	41	10	29	0.34
14	53.3	1	13	0.08
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	1	22	0.05
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	4	23	0.17
21	33.3	5	20	0.25
24	75	2	15	0.13
25	41.7	6	82	0.07
26	51.7	3	29	0.10
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	5	23	0.22
31	75	2	18	0.11
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	3	11	0.27
49	51.7	9	29	0.31
41	63.3	3	18	0.17
42	40	6	18	0.33
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	3	16	0.19
46	71.7	1	19	0.05
48	31.7	3	26	0.12
49	66.7	1	26	0.04
52	33.3	6	25	0.24
53	63.3	1	34	0.03
54	61.7	3	18	0.17
55	35	3	26	0.12
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

DIT Scores and Helpee Focused Skills Used

TABLE 11

Hypothesis 4

ID	P%	No. of Helpee Focused Skills Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	8	28	0.29
2	43.3	12	26	0.46
3	65	11	18	0.61
4	41.7	1	16	0.06
6	33.3	8	58	0.14
7	23.3	6	42	0.14
9	45.5	10	11	0.91
11	40	5	17	0.29
12	55	4	21	0.19
13	41	3	29	0.10
14	53.3	1	13	0.08
15	36.7	3	22	0.14
16	48.3	9	22	0.41
18	38.3	4	21	0.19
19	51.7	15	23	0.65
21	33.3	9	20	0.45
24	75	12	15	0.80
25	41.7	16	82	0.20
26	51.7	15	29	0.52
27	61.7	13	10	1.30
28	50	7	16	0.44
29	51.7	7	23	0.30
31	75	8	18	0.44
32	56.7	16	22	0.73
34	48.3	8	18	0.44
35	45.8	5	11	0.45
49	51.7	0	29	0.00
41	63.3	8	18	0.44
42	40	11	18	0.61
43	33.3	6	23	0.26
44	46.7	5	12	0.42
45	45	8	16	0.50
46	71.7	10	19	0.53
48	31.7	17	26	0.65
49	66.7	19	26	0.73
52	33.3	15	25	0.60
53	63.3	26	34	0.76
54	61.7	4	18	0.22
55	35	8	26	0.31
56	38.3	3	10	0.30

TABLE 12

DIT Scores and Open Questions

(Hypothesis 5)

ID	P%	No. of Open Questions Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	5	28	0.18
2	43.3	3	26	0.12
3	65	6	18	0.33
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	13	58	0.22
7	23.3	11	42	0.26
9	45.5	4	11	0.36
11	40	6	17	0.35
12	55	3	21	0.14
13	41	8	29	0.28
14	53.3	3	13	0.23
15	36.7	6	22	0.27
16	48.3	10	22	0.45
18	38.3	4	21	0.19
19	51.7	7	23	0.30
21	33.3	6	20	0.30
24	75	6	15	0.40
25	41.7	16	82	0.20
26	51.7	3	29	0.10
27	61.7	2	10	0.20
28	50	5	16	0.31
29	51.7	1	23	0.04
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	4	22	0.18
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	6	11	0.55
49	51.7	2	29	0.07
41	63.3	5	18	0.28
42	40	5	18	0.28
43	33.3	6	23	0.26
44	46.7	5	12	0.42
45	45	6	16	0.38
46	71.7	3	19	0.16
48	31.7	11	26	0.42
49	66.7	9	26	0.35
52	33.3	9	25	0.36
53	63.3	5	34	0.15
54	61.7	3	18	0.17
55	35	5	26	0.19
56	38.3	4	10	0.40

TABLE 13

DIT Scores and Closed Questions

ID	P%	No. of Closed Questions Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	5	28	0.18
2	43.3	7	26	0.27
3	65	7	18	0.39
4	41.7	13	16	0.81
6	33.3	12	58	0.21
7	23.3	13	42	0.31
9	45.5	3	11	0.27
11	40	2	17	0.12
12	55	5	21	0.24
13	41	6	29	0.21
14	53.3	2	13	0.15
15	36.7	2	22	0.09
16	48.3	6	22	0.27
18	38.3	5	21	0.24
19	51.7	10	23	0.43
21	33.3	5	20	0.25
24	75	5	15	0.33
25	41.7	37	82	0.45
26	51.7	15	29	0.52
27	61.7	3	10	0.30
28	50	5	16	0.31
29	51.7	12	23	0.52
31	75	5	18	0.28
32	56.7	7	22	0.32
34	48.3	11	18	0.61
35	45.8	3	11	0.27
49	51.7	6	29	0.21
41	63.3	6	18	0.33
42	40	1	18	0.06
43	33.3	4	23	0.17
44	46.7	5	12	0.42
45	45	1	16	0.06
46	71.7	0	19	0.00
48	31.7	8	26	0.31
49	66.7	4	26	0.15
52	33.3	2	25	0.08
53	63.3	19	34	0.56
54	61.7	2	18	0.11
55	35	4	26	0.15
56	38.3	6	10	0.60

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 14

DIT Scores and Minimal Encourages

ID	P%	No. of Minimal Encourages Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	3	28	0.11
2	43.3	3	26	0.12
3	65	1	18	0.06
4	41.7	1	16	0.06
6	33.3	0	58	0.00
7	23.3	13	42	0.31
9	45.5	1	11	0.09
11	40	0	17	0.00
12	55	0	21	0.00
13	41	0	29	0.00
14	53.3	7	13	0.54
15	36.7	12	22	0.55
16	48.3	1	22	0.05
18	38.3	10	21	0.48
19	51.7	2	23	0.09
21	33.3	0	20	0.00
24	75	4	15	0.27
25	41.7	6	82	0.07
26	51.7	0	29	0.00
27	61.7	2	10	0.20
28	50	5	16	0.31
29	51.7	3	23	0.13
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	4	22	0.18
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	6	11	0.55
49	51.7	2	29	0.07
41	63.3	1	18	0.06
42	40	2	18	0.11
43	33.3	9	23	0.39
44	46.7	2	12	0.17
45	45	1	16	0.06
46	71.7	6	19	0.32
48	31.7	0	26	0.00
49	66.7	2	26	0.08
52	33.3	4	25	0.16
53	63.3	6	34	0.18
54	61.7	1	18	0.06
55	35	5	26	0.19
56	38.3	4	10	0.40

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 15

DIT Scores and Paraphrase Usage

Hypothesis 5

ID	P%	No. of Paraphases Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	0	28	0.00
2	43.3	5	26	0.19
3	65	2	18	0.11
4	41.7	2	16	0.13
6	33.3	0	58	0.00
7	23.3	1	42	0.02
9	45.5	1	11	0.09
11	40	2	17	0.12
12	55	1	21	0.05
13	41	1	29	0.03
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	1	22	0.05
16	48.3	4	22	0.18
18	38.3	2	21	0.10
19	51.7	6	23	0.26
21	33.3	3	20	0.15
24	75	1	15	0.07
25	41.7	7	82	0.09
26	51.7	5	29	0.17
27	61.7	3	10	0.30
28	50	1	16	0.06
29	51.7	2	23	0.09
31	75	3	18	0.17
32	56.7	2	22	0.09
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
49	51.7	7	29	0.24
41	63.3	2	18	0.11
42	40	3	18	0.17
43	33.3	33	23	1.43
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	3	16	0.19
46	71.7	5	19	0.26
48	31.7	2	26	0.08
49	66.7	5	26	0.19
52	33.3	3	25	0.12
53	63.3	1	34	0.03
54	61.7	5	18	0.28
55	35	7	26	0.27
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 16

DIT Scores and Interpretations Usage

(Hypothesis 5)

ID	P%	No. of Interpretations Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	1	28	0.04
2	43.3	0	26	0.00
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	0	58	0.00
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	0	11	0.00
11	40	0	17	0.00
12	55	0	21	0.00
13	41	0	29	0.00
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	3	23	0.13
21	33.3	0	20	0.00
24	75	0	15	0.00
25	41.7	0	82	0.00
26	51.7	0	29	0.00
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	2	23	0.09
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	1	11	0.09
49	51.7	0	29	0.00
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	0	18	0.00
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	0	16	0.00
46	71.7	0	19	0.00
48	31.7	0	26	0.00
49	66.7	0	26	0.00
52	33.3	0	25	0.00
53	63.3	0	34	0.00
54	61.7	0	18	0.00
55	35	0	26	0.00
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 17

DIT Scores and Disclosures Usage

(Hypothesis 5)

ID	P%	No. of Self Disclosured Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	7	28	0.25
2	43.3	4	26	0.15
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	9	58	0.16
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	1	11	0.09
11	40	1	17	0.06
12	55	2	21	0.10
13	41	1	29	0.03
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	0	23	0.00
21	33.3	0	20	0.00
24	75	0	15	0.00
25	41.7	0	82	0.00
26	51.7	0	29	0.00
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	0	23	0.00
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
39	51.7	1	29	0.03
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	0	18	0.00
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	0	16	0.00
46	71.7	0	19	0.00
48	31.7	0	26	0.00
49	66.7	0	26	0.00
52	33.3	2	25	0.08
53	63.3	0	34	0.00
54	61.7	0	18	0.00
55	35	0	26	0.00
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

TABLE 18

DIT Scores and Expression of Feeling Usage

ID	P%	No. of Expressions of Feeling Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	1	28	0.04
2	43.3	0	26	0.00
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	0	58	0.00
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	0	11	0.00
11	40	0	17	0.00
12	55	3	21	0.14
13	41	3	29	0.10
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	1	22	0.05
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	1	23	0.04
21	33.3	1	20	0.05
24	75	1	15	0.07
25	41.7	3	82	0.04
26	51.7	2	29	0.07
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	1	23	0.04
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
39	51.7	4	29	0.14
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	4	18	0.22
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	1	16	0.06
46	71.7	0	19	0.00
48	31.7	2	26	0.08
49	66.7	0	26	0.00
52	33.3	3	25	0.12
53	63.3	0	34	0.00
54	61.7	0	18	0.00
55	35	1	26	0.04
56	38.3	1	10	0.10

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 19

DIT Scores and Expression of Content Usage

(Hypothesis 5)

ID	P%	No. of Expressions of Content Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	3	28	0.11
2	43.3	3	26	0.12
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	4	16	0.25
6	33.3	6	58	0.10
7	23.3	4	42	0.10
9	45.5	0	11	0.00
11	40	5	17	0.29
12	55	4	21	0.19
13	41	6	29	0.21
14	53.3	1	13	0.08
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	0	23	0.00
21	33.3	4	20	0.20
24	75	1	15	0.07
25	41.7	3	82	0.04
26	51.7	1	29	0.03
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	2	23	0.09
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	2	11	0.18
39	51.7	2	29	0.07
41	63.3	3	18	0.17
42	40	2	18	0.11
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	1	16	0.06
46	71.7	1	19	0.05
48	31.7	1	26	0.04
49	66.7	1	26	0.04
52	33.3	1	25	0.04
53	63.3	1	34	0.03
54	61.7	3	18	0.17
55	35	2	26	0.08
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 20

DIT Scores and Directions Usage

(Hypothesis 5)

ID	P%	No. of Directions Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	1	28	0.04
2	43.3	1	26	0.04
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	0	58	0.00
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	0	11	0.00
11	40	0	17	0.00
12	55	0	21	0.00
13	41	0	29	0.00
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	0	23	0.00
21	33.3	0	20	0.00
24	75	0	15	0.00
25	41.7	0	82	0.00
26	51.7	0	29	0.00
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	0	23	0.00
31	75	1	18	0.06
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
39	51.7	2	29	0.07
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	0	18	0.00
43	33.3	0	23	0.00
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	1	16	0.06
46	71.7	0	19	0.00
48	31.7	0	26	0.00
49	66.7	0	26	0.00
52	33.3	0	25	0.00
53	63.3	0	34	0.00
54	61.7	0	18	0.00
55	35	0	26	0.00
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

TABLE 21

DIT Scores and Summaries Usage

ID	P%	No. of Summaries Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	1	28	0.04
2	43.3	1	26	0.04
3	65	0	18	0.00
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	11	58	0.19
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	0	11	0.00
11	40	0	17	0.00
12	55	1	21	0.05
13	41	2	29	0.07
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	0	22	0.00
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	4	23	0.17
21	33.3	1	20	0.05
24	75	1	15	0.07
25	41.7	0	82	0.00
26	51.7	1	29	0.03
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	0	23	0.00
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
39	51.7	0	29	0.00
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	1	18	0.06
43	33.3	1	23	0.04
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	2	16	0.13
46	71.7	3	19	0.16
48	31.7	1	26	0.04
49	66.7	4	26	0.15
52	33.3	1	25	0.04
53	63.3	1	34	0.03
54	61.7	2	18	0.11
55	35	1	26	0.04
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX C (Cont.)

TABLE 22

DIT Scores and Reflections of Feeling Usage

ID	P%	No. of Reflection Of Feeling Used	Total Number Skills Used	% of Total Usage
1	43.3	1	28	0.04
2	43.3	1	26	0.04
3	65	2	18	0.11
4	41.7	0	16	0.00
6	33.3	8	58	0.14
7	23.3	0	42	0.00
9	45.5	2	11	0.18
11	40	1	17	0.06
12	55	0	21	0.00
13	41	2	29	0.07
14	53.3	0	13	0.00
15	36.7	1	22	0.05
16	48.3	0	22	0.00
18	38.3	0	21	0.00
19	51.7	4	23	0.17
21	33.3	0	20	0.00
24	75	0	15	0.00
25	41.7	0	82	0.00
26	51.7	2	29	0.07
27	61.7	0	10	0.00
28	50	0	16	0.00
29	51.7	0	23	0.00
31	75	0	18	0.00
32	56.7	0	22	0.00
34	48.3	0	18	0.00
35	45.8	0	11	0.00
39	51.7	0	29	0.00
41	63.3	0	18	0.00
42	40	1	18	0.06
43	33.3	1	23	0.04
44	46.7	0	12	0.00
45	45	2	16	0.13
46	71.7	3	19	0.16
48	31.7	1	26	0.04
49	66.7	4	26	0.15
52	33.3	1	25	0.04
53	63.3	1	34	0.03
54	61.7	2	18	0.11
55	35	1	26	0.04
56	38.3	0	10	0.00

APPENDIX D

TABLE 23

DIT Score and Quality Score

ID	P%	QS
1	43.3	42.5
2	43.3	47.5
3	65.0	50.0
4	41.7	37.5
6	33.3	65.0
7	23.3	52.5
9	45.5	80.0
11	40.0	77.5
12	55.0	77.5
13	41.0	70.0
14	53.3	52.5
15	36.7	57.5
16	48.3	52.5
18	38.3	62.5
19	51.7	00.0
21	33.3	60.0
24	75.0	80.0
25	41.7	50.0
26	51.7	97.5
27	61.7	55.0
28	50.0	67.5
29	51.7	57.5
31	75.0	62.5
32	56.7	57.5
34	48.3	47.5
35	45.8	65.0
39	51.7	90.0
41	63.3	67.5
42	40.0	95.0
43	33.3	67.5
44	46.7	47.5
45	45.0	62.5
46	71.7	57.5
48	31.7	50.0
49	66.7	70.0
52	33.3	50.0
53	63.3	57.5
54	61.7	77.5
55	35.0	42.5
56	38.3	50.0

APPENDIX E

Table 24

Results of Ratings For Quality Score

ID	RATER ID K	T	M	P	TE	D	C	KA	PA	E	TOTAL	AVERAGE RANK	QS
1	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	4	2	1	17	1.7	42.5
2	2	1	4	1	4	1	1	2	2	1	19	1.9	47.5
3	1	4	2	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	32	3.2	50.0
4	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	15	1.5	37.5
6	3	2	2	1	2	4	3	3	3	3	26	2.6	65.0
7	2	2	1	1	3	3	2	2	3	2	21	2.1	52.5
9	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	1	4	3	32	3.2	80.0
11	3	4	3	3	2	3	4	2	3	4	31	3.1	77.5
12	2	3	3	3	4	4	3	1	4	4	31	3.1	77.5
13	3	2	2	2	4	2	4	3	4	2	28	2.8	70.0
14	2	2	1	4	1	1	2	4	3	1	21	2.1	52.5
15	2	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	23	2.3	57.5
16	2	1	2	3	2	2	4	2	2	1	21	2.1	52.5
18	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	1	2	2	25	2.5	62.5
19	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	40	4.0	100.0
21	3	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	4	2	24	2.4	60.0
24	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	32	3.2	80.0
25	1	1	3	1	2	2	4	2	2	2	20	2.0	50.0
26	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	39	3.9	97.5
27	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	4	2	1	22	2.2	55.0
28	2	1	3	2	4	2	3	4	2	4	27	2.7	67.5
29	2	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	4	1	23	2.3	57.5
31	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	1	3	3	25	2.5	62.5
32	3	2	4	1	1	2	1	4	3	1	23	2.3	57.5
34	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	1	19	1.9	47.5
35	1	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	26	2.6	65.0
39	4	3	3	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	36	3.6	90.0
41	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	27	2.7	67.5
42	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	38	3.8	95.0
43	2	4	2	3	4	4	2	3	2	2	27	2.7	67.5
44	1	1	4	1	1	3	2	2	2	2	19	1.9	47.5
45	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	25	2.5	62.5
46	1	2	2	1	1	4	2	4	4	2	23	2.3	57.5
48	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	1	20	2.0	50.0
49	3	2	1	2	4	2	2	1	4	4	25	2.5	70.0
52	2	1	2	2	3	2	3	1	3	1	20	2.0	50.0
53	3	1	2	2	3	2	3	4	2	1	23	2.3	57.5
54	2	3	3	4	2	4	3	3	4	1	29	2.9	77.5
55	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	3	1	17	1.7	42.5
56	2	3	2	1	2	2	3	1	3	1	20	2.0	50.0

APPENDIX F

Table 25

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND RANGE FOR ALL VARIABLES

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
Closed Question	40	28.49	17.20	0	81.25
Open Question	40	25.81	11.92	0	45.45
Minimal Encourages	40	14.86	16.33	0	54.54
Paraphrase	40	11.17	8.61	0	30.00
Reflection of Feeling	40	4.48	5.58	0	18.18
Summaries	40	2.83	4.10	0	18.96
Directions	40	0.64	1.79	0	6.89
Expression of Content	40	6.61	7.49	0	29.41
Expression of Feeling	40	3.44	5.23	0	22.22
Self Disclosure	40	2.38	5.47	0	25.00
Interpretations	40	0.74	2.36	0	9.09
Different Microskills Used	40	55.00	17.70	18.18	90.90
Helpee Focused Skills Used	40	39.10	21.66	0	90.90
Attending Skills Used	40	86.85	13.03	53.57	100.00
Influencing Skills Used	40	13.71	13.45	0	46.42
Quality Score	40	59.37	14.55	37.50	100.00
P% Score	40	48.30	12.66	23.30	75.00

Note: All values (except N) indicate percent of use. Raw data are presented in Table 26.

APPENDIX G

Microskills Tally Sheet

Counselor Name _____ ID# _____

Closed Questions..... _____

Open Questions..... _____

Minimal Encourages..... _____

Paraphrases..... _____

Reflections of Feelings..... _____

Summaries..... _____

Directions..... _____

Expressions of Content..... _____

Expressions of Feeling..... _____

Self Disclosures..... _____

Interpretations..... _____

Different Microskills Used..... _____

"Helpee" Focused Counselor Leads..... _____

QUALITY SCORE..... _____

Demographic Data

Sex: Male ___ Female ___
Age: 18-22 ___ 23-28 ___ 29-60 ___
Experience: None ___ Some to 2 years ___ More than 2 years ___

APPENDIX H

Table 26, Listing of The Microskills Usage Raw Data

RAW DATA	ID#.	1	2	3	4	6	7	9	11
Closed Questions		5	7	7	13	12	13	3	2
Open Questions		5	3	6	0	13	11	4	6
Minimal Encourages		3	3	1	1	0	13	1	0
Paraphrases		0	5	2	2	0	1	1	2
Reflections of Feeling		1	1	2	0	8	0	2	1
Summaries		1	1	0	0	11	0	0	0
Directions		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Expressions of Content		3	3	0	0	6	4	0	5
Expressions of Feeling		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self Disclosures		7	4	0	0	9	0	1	1
Interpretations		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Different Microskills Used		10	8	5	3	5	5	6	6
Helpee Focused Skills		8	12	11	1	8	6	10	5
Attending Skills Used		15	18	18	16	43	38	10	11
Influencing Skills Used		13	8	0	0	15	4	1	6
Total Skills Used		28	26	18	16	58	42	11	17
Sex		M	F	F	M	F	F	F	F
Age		20	22	21	21	21	21	30	20
Experience		1	3	2	1	2	2	3	2
Quality Score		1.7	1.9	3.2	1.5	2.6	2.1	3.3	3.1
P% Score		43.3	43.3	65.0	41.7	33.3	23.3	45.5	40.0

RAW DATA	ID#.	13	14	15	16	18	21	25	26
Closed Questions		6	2	2	6	5	5	37	15
Open Questions		8	3	6	10	4	6	16	3
Minimal Encourages		0	7	12	1	10	0	6	0
Paraphrases		1	0	1	4	2	3	7	5
Reflections of Feeling		2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Summaries		2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Directions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Expressions of Content		6	1	0	0	0	4	3	1
Expressions of Feeling		3	0	0	1	0	1	3	2
Self Disclosures		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Interpretations		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Different Microskills Used		8	4	5	5	4	6	6	7
Helpee Focused Skills		3	1	3	9	4	9	16	15
Attending Skills Used		19	12	22	21	21	15	76	26
Influencing Skills Used		10	1	0	1	0	5	6	3
Total Skills Used		29	13	22	22	21	20	82	29
Sex		F	F	F	F	F	F	M	F
Age		20	40	23	20	21	21	23	19
Experience		2	3	2	2	1	2	2	2
Quality Score		3.1	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.0	3.9
P% Score		41	53.3	36.7	48.3	38.3	33.3	41.7	51.7

APPENDIX H (Cont.)
Table 26, Listing of The Microskills Usage Raw Data

RAW DATA	ID#. 27	28	19	29	12	24	31	32
Closed Questions	3	5	10	12	5	5	5	7
Open Questions	2	5	7	1	3	6	8	9
Minimal Encourages	2	5	2	3	0	4	0	4
Paraphrases	3	1	6	2	1	1	3	2
Reflections of Feeling	0	0	4	0	3	0	0	0
Summaries	0	0	3	0	1	1	1	0
Directions	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Expressions of Content	0	0	0	2	4	1	0	0
Expressions of Feeling	0	0	1	1	3	1	0	0
Self Disclosures	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Interpretations	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0
Different Microskills Used	4	4	8	7	8	7	5	4
Helpee Focused Skills	3	7	15	17	14	12	8	16
Attending Skills Used	10	16	32	18	13	13	17	22
Influencing Skills Used	0	0	4	5	9	2	2	0
Total Skills Used	10	16	36	23	21	15	18	22
Sex	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Age	21	35	23	31	19	20	28	20
Experience	2	1	3	3	1	2	2	2
Quality Score	2.2	2.7	4.0	2.3	3.1	3.2	2.5	2.3
P% Score	61.7	50.0	51.7	51.75	5.0	75.0	75.0	56.7

RAW DATA	ID#. 34	35	39	41	42	43	44	45
Closed Questions	11	3	6	6	1	4	5	1
Open Questions	7	1	2	5	5	6	5	6
Minimal Encourages	0	6	2	1	2	9	2	1
Paraphrases	0	0	7	2	3	3	0	3
Reflections of Feeling	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Summaries	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0
Directions	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1
Expressions of Content	0	2	2	3	2	0	0	1
Expressions of Feeling	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	1
Self Disclosures	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Interpretations	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Different Microskills Used	2	5	9	6	7	5	3	8
Helpee Focused Skills	18	5	0	8	11	6	5	8
Attending Skills Used	18	10	20	15	12	23	12	13
Influencing Skills Used	0	3	9	3	6	0	0	3
Total Skills Used	18	11	29	15	12	23	12	16
Sex	F	M	F	M	F	F	F	F
Age	21	33	24	21	23	22	20	23
Experience	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	3
Quality Score	1.9	2.6	3.6	2.7	3.8	2.7	1.9	2.5
P% Score	48.3	45.8	51.7	63.6	40.0	33.3	46.7	45.0

APPENDIX H (Cont.)

Table 26, Listing of The Microskills Usage Raw Data

RAW DATA	ID#.	46	48	49	52	53	54	55	56
Closed Questions		0	8	4	2	19	2	4	6
Open Questions		3	11	9	9	5	3	5	4
Minimal Encourages		6	0	2	4	6	1	5	0
Paraphrases		5	2	5	3	1	5	7	0
Reflections of Feeling		3	1	4	1	1	2	1	0
Summaries		1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0
Directions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Expressions of Content		1	1	1	1	1	3	2	0
Expressions of Feeling		0	2	0	3	0	0	1	1
Self Disclosures		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Interpretations		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Different Microskills Used		7	7	7	8	7	10	8	3
Helpee Focused Skills		10	17	19	15	20	4	8	3
Attending Skills Used		18	23	25	19	33	15	23	10
Influencing Skills Used		1	3	1	6	1	3	3	0
Total Skills Used		19	26	26	25	34	18	26	10
Sex		F	F	F	M	F	F	F	F
Age		22	20	23	20	29	30	20	20
Experience		3	3	1	1	1	3	2	2
Quality Score		2.3	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.3	2.9	1.7	2.0
P% Score		71.7	31.7	66.7	33.3	63.3	61.7	35.0	38.3